Intellectual Property Brief
Volume 6 | Issue 1

Article 3

Between Scylla and Charybdis: Patentability and
Morality Related to Human Embryonic Stem Cells
Li Jiang

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
Recommended Citation
Jiang, Li. "Between Scylla and Charybdis: Patentability and Morality Related to Human Embryonic Stem Cells." Intellectual Property
Brief 6, no. 1 (2015): 53-97.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Intellectual Property Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Between Scylla and Charybdis: Patentability and Morality Related to
Human Embryonic Stem Cells

This article is available in Intellectual Property Brief: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol6/iss1/3

JIANG_ FINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

1/29/2015 1:25 PM

BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS:
PATENTABILITY AND MORALITY RELATED
TO HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS
LI JIANG*
ABSTRACT
The patentability of inventions related to Human Embryonic Stem Cells
(HESC) is challenged by the morality provision of various nations’
regulations.1 This Article discusses whether it is a matter of expediency to
prohibit granting patents to HESC-related inventions based on moralitybased provisions, and it concludes that this is not appropriate. To claim
this, the Article explores typical cases and regulations in the European
Union, United States, and China. However, different areas adopt various
approaches in dealing with this extremely complex issue. This comparison
sheds light on the inappropriate combination of morality and patentability
in the EU and China. The comparison of these areas also demonstrates
infusing patent law with morality is both inefficient and ineffective as
morality is not a criterion that patent authorities should consider.

* Li Jiang holds a Ph.D. from Bangor University Law School, a LL. M from Shandong
University, and a B.S. in Biotechnology from University of Science and Technology
Beijing, The author would like to thank Dr Shi Wei for his invaluable input, as well as the
staff of the Intellectual Property Brief for their tremendous work and care, without which
this publication would not be possible.
1. See Article 53(a) of European Patent Convention (stating that “European patents
shall not be granted in respect of inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality; such exploitation shall not be deemed to be so
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the
Contracting States”); see also Article 5 of Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China
(stating that patent rights shall not be granted for invention-creations that violate the law or
social ethics or harm public interests); Article 32 of Korean Patent Law (stating that
inventions liable to contravene the public order or morality or cause injury to the public
health shall not be patentable).
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Additionally, in terms of funds invested into research, the reward of a
patent seems to have been overvalued. This Article argues that it is better
to establish the specific authority to monitor HESC research instead of
infusing morality with patentability. A patent system without a moral clause
would be beneficial to move HESC research forward.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract........................................................................................................53
Introduction .................................................................................................55
I. The European Union: Inconsistent Interpretations of Moral
Provisions in Patent Law ..................................................................60
A. How to assess the morality? .........................................................61
1. Howard Florey/Relaxin: the “abhorrence” standard with
rebuttable presumption approach .........................................61
2. Harvard/Onco-mouse: The “unacceptability” standard .........62
3. Plant Genetic Systems v. Greenpeace: The conflict
between “abhorrence” standard and “unacceptability”
standard ................................................................................63
B. Whether HESC-related inventions should be included in
“human embryo?” What is the scope of “industrial or
commercial use?” ......................................................................65
1. University of Edinburgh: A broad approach by the
Opposition Division on the interpretation of “human
embryos” ..............................................................................66
2. Use of embryos/WARF (G2/06): The landmark ruling
by the European Patent Office (EPO) patenting HESC .......68
3. Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace: The decision by
European Court of Justice on patenting HESC ....................72
II China: inconsistent moral standards between patent law and
practical application ..........................................................................74
A. Whether Article 5 of the patent law excludes inventions
related to HESC? .......................................................................75
1. Advanced Cell Technology related to the differentiation
of HESC and its culture method:
lacking the
explanation of “embryo” and “industrial or commercial
purpose” ...............................................................................75
2. Shanghai Genon Biological Product: HESCs with the
possibility of developing into human being are within
the scope of “human embryo” .............................................77
3. Case the Regents of the University of California: It is
improper to trace the origin of the world’s first HESC

JIANG_ FINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

1/29/2015 1:25 PM

BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS

55

lines; therefore, established stem cell lines are allowed ......79
B. Low moral status of human embryos in practical application......81
C. High moral status of the human embryo in patent law.................81
III. The United States: Inconsistent Policies on Federal Funding
Control of HESC Research ...............................................................83
A. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF): the
opening of “human embryo farms” ...........................................84
B. Political interventions—the federal funding control of HESC
research under moral concerns ..................................................86
1. The National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act:
Allow Federal Funding of Research Related to
Embryos at the Early Stage ..................................................87
2. Dickey-Wicker Amendment: No Federal Funding on
HESC Research Involving Destruction of an Embryo ........88
3. NIH Guideline 2000 ..............................................................89
4. The Bush Compromise accepted the narrow explanation
of Dickey-Wicker Amendment but exercised the
executive power instead of legal power to allocate
funding .................................................................................90
5. The Report from the President Council on Bioethics
clarified that the enforcement law was the Dickey
Amendment..........................................................................92
6. Executive order by President Obama: Reversing The
Bush Compromise ...............................................................93
7. The result of the battle over the Dickey-Wicker
Amendment: The Obama Administration funding
policy of HESC research could move forward ....................94
Conclusion ...................................................................................................96

INTRODUCTION
Inventions related to Human Embryonic Stem Cells (HESC) as a
patentable subject matter are in considerable flux.2 In most circumstances,
2. See Amanda Odell West, The Absence of Informed Consent to Commercial
Exploitation for Inventions Developed from Human Biological Material: A Bar to
Patentability?, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 373, 390 (2009) (arguing that inventions using human
biological matter should submit “evidence of ethical approval” with its application to the
EPO); Amanda Warren-Jones, A Mouse in Sheep’s Clothing: The Challenge to the Patent
Morality Criterion Posed by “Dolly”, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 445, 450 (1998)
(discussing the obstacles presented to HESC-related inventions under the current European
patent system); see also Graeme Laurie, Patenting Stem Cells of Human Origin, 26 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 59, 59 (2004) (expressing concern over the “bioethical aspects of the
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morality and law may not coincide, yet moral obstacles are significant for
inventions related to HESC research. Patent examiners inevitably encounter
moral issues when examining applications related to HESC.
The
connection between law and morality in HESC is natural and “hardly
new.”3 The creation, operation, and interpretation of the patent system is
inherently linked to moral standards.4 Some consider the marriage of law
and morality in this area to be in “a hopelessly confused state.”5
Different from the patentability of other inventions, morality plays an
important role in patenting HESC inventions. Therefore, we must ask
whether it is reasonable to reject HESC inventions on moral grounds.
Every jurisdiction develops its own answer to this question due to the
diversity of moral standards and the territorial patent system.6 On the one
hand, the patent prohibition of HESC related inventions based on morality
issues is unreasonable since the supposedly immoral research has already
been carried out. 7 This immoral research should neither be funded nor
initiated instead of being ineligible for patenting because, even if prohibited
from patenting, the immoral research has already been carried out. Moral
considerations are deeply rooted in the EU—and this is even true in the
United Kingdom, which has liberal policies towards HESC research.8 In
the EU, in order to harmonize HESC regulation, regulators have erected a
law”).
3. See Peter Drahos, Biotechnology Patents, Markets and Morality, 21 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 441, 441 (1999) (pointing out “[s]ome areas of law invite adjudicators to draw
on morality in the process of legal decision-making. Somewhat surprisingly, given its
characterization as a tool of economic regulation, patent law does just this . . . The express
connection between patent law and morality is hardly new”).
4. Id.
5. See Laurie, supra note 2 at 65 (stating that the introduction of HESC technology
has demonstrated that the system is flawed).
6. For example, the US patent system does not preclude patenting HESC inventions.
See U.S. Patent, No. 5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996) (issued Dec. 1, 1998), U.S. Patent No.
6,200,806 (filed Jun. 26, 1998) (issued Mar. 13, 2001), and U.S. Patent No. 7,029,913 (filed
Oct. 18, 2001) (issued Apr. 18, 2006). The EU patent system precludes patenting HESC
inventions; see generally Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306.
7. See generally Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306 (explaining
that practicing the invention conflicts with concepts of morality, not the act of patenting the
invention).
8. See Aurora Plomer, Beyond the HFE Act 1990: The Regulation of Stem Cell
Research in the UK, 10 MED. L. REV. 132, 132-44 (2002) (stating that “[t]he UK currently
stands alone in Europe in permitting the creation of human embryos specifically for research
purposes, including the use of cloning techniques”); see also Dame Mary Warnock DBE,
The Warnock Report, HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITIES (June 26,
1984), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2068.html (discussing two extreme views: one is
from members of the Catholic Church who believe human embryos have human status, and
another is from utilitarians who insist human embryos have no moral status).
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moral barrier to patenting HESC-related inventions.9 The moral barrier in
patent law is ineffective and inefficient. First, although the European Patent
Convention made a great effort to harmonize the patentability and morality
of HESC through the EU Biotechnology Directive,10 the morality standards
for patentability are inconsistently interpreted, specifically by including
the definitions for morality, human embryo, industrial use, and commercial
use.11 In addition, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European
Patent Office’s (EPO) dual system of assessing morality standards has
resulted in legal uncertainty. 12 Also, member states have different
interpretations for adapting the moral exclusion of the European Patent
Convention.13 This legal inconsistency has added procedural complexity
and thus hampered technological advancement. Second, many HESC
related research projects are funded by the EU; however, the results of
these research projects cannot be patented. 14 Taken to its logical end,
‘immoral’ research should not receive EU funding in the first place if it
cannot later be patented for these reasons. If the research could be funded
by the EU, this research should be morally examined before being
concluded because funding research projects that are precluded from patent
protection is a waste of money and time. Therefore, we should reconsider
how much patent law can accommodate morality issues.
9. Article 53(a) of European Patent Convention (“European patents shall not be
granted in respect of inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to
‘ordre public’ or morality.”).
10. See Article 53(a) of European Patent Convention; Directive 98/44/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council: Of July 6, 1998 of the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions (arguing for greater legal protections for biotechnological
inventions).
11. See Laurie, supra note 2 at 59-66 (stating that “despite the fact that disquiet and
discussions of an ethic nature held up the adoption of the biotechnology Directive for so
long, it is far from clear that we are any further forward in developing uniform, logical,
principled, and defensible ethical guidelines within European patent law”).
12. See generally Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO.306.
13. See generally ÅSA HELLSTADIUS, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE’S MORALITY CLAUSE, IN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL
PATENTS: EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND ETHICS 96-148 (Aurora Plomer & Paul Torremans
eds., 1st ed. Oxford University Press) (2009).
14. “Since 2007, the EU had funded twenty-seven collaborative health research
projects involving the use of human embryonic stem cells with an EU contribution of about
€157 million. Human embryonic stem cell research projects represent approximately one
third of health projects on all forms of stem cells. In addition, the European Research
Council had funded 10 projects for an EU financial contribution of about €19 million and
there have been twenty-four Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions involving human embryonic
stem cell research worth €23 million.” European Citizens’ Initiative:
European
Commission replies to ‘One of Us’ – Q&A, European Commission (May 28, 2014),
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-385_en.doc.
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On the other hand, the patent prohibition of HESC-related inventions
based on morality issues does not seem to be an effective method of
controlling immoral research. For example, although China’s patent law
contains a moral exclusion clause, doctors remain uncertain as to the types
of research they are permitted to conduct due to ambivalence towards
moral and medicals risks.15 This article takes the view that the adoption of
the moral exclusion clause in patent law by Chinese regulators merely
reflects the perception that the moral exclusion represents an international
custom. However, interpretations of the moral exclusion clause in patent
law are severely lacking. The considerable gap left by the moral provision
makes it confusing and controversial. There are reports of many promising
stem cell therapies, such as stem cell therapy for cardiac repair, GraftVersus-Host disease, limb ischemla, liver disease, and neural repair being
conducted in Chinese hospitals. 16 However, these therapies are still not
tested by clinic trial and are unsafe for patients. In response to pressure
from stem cell market demands, some scientists from areas with restrictive
policies, such as the EU, will move to areas that have permissive policies or
alternatively, some might conduct research in more permissive regions,
such as China. Thus, HESC research involving cloning and other sensitive
procedures will become more difficult to monitor, resulting in biomedical
adventurism, which may disrupt the legal and social infrastructure of the
world.17
This article then discusses whether HESC research can be monitored in
circumstances when morality issues are not the barriers to patenting. After
exploring the U.S.’s HESC-related regulations, the author believes that it is
technically manageable and pragmatically meaningful to supervise HESC
research without moral exclusion in patent law. For example, there is no
moral exclusion in US patent regulation.18 The U.S. government takes a
rather practical approach of patenting in order to remain competitive in the
HESC market. 19 HESC-related inventions are not prohibited from
15. Ole Döring, China’s Struggle for Practical Regulations in Medical Ethics, 4
NATURE REV. GENETICS 233-39 (2003).
16. See Lianming Liao and Robert Chunhua Zhao, An Overview of Stem-Cell Based
Clinical Trials in China, 17 STEM CELLS AND DEV. 613, 613-618 (2008) (discussing China’s
progressive “therapeutic application” of stem cell technologies).
17. Ole Doring, Chinese Researchers Promote Biomedical Regulations: What are the
Motives of the Biopolitical Dawn in China and Where are they Heading?, 14 KENNEDY
INST. ETHICS J. 39, 42 (2004) (commenting that “the positivistic principle ‘if an action is not
illegal, by definition, it is legal’ does not apply in China. Taking advantage of the fact that
policymaking lags behind scientific and economic development, in terms of the entire legal
and social infrastructure, amounts to biomedical adventurism”).
18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
19. See generally Comment, Gabriel S. Gross, Federally Funding Human Embryonic
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patenting for moral reasons. 20 Federal funding is only used for morally
acceptable HESC research, which provides an important tool for
monitoring HESC research.21 Although this hands-off approach is market
orientated,22 opponents have strongly criticized this approach for its lack of
ethical and social considerations.23 This article argues that funding control
is a better way to monitor HESC research. From an economic perspective,
deciding to prohibit immoral research at the initial stage saves both time
and money.
The above comparison of the U.S., EU, and China demonstrates that
integrating morality into patent law is both inefficient and ineffective.
Morality is not a criterion that patent authorities should be tasked with
assessing. Even if the results of HESC research cannot be patented, it
could still be performed and funded. However, immoral research should be
prohibited from the outset instead of at the patent application stage.
Moreover, from an economic point of view, restricting immoral research
from the beginning could save a tremendous amount of time and money.
Additionally, in terms of funds invested into research, the reward of a
patent seems to have been overvalued. A patent system without a moral
clause would be more beneficial for advancing HESC research. The EU
and Chinese Patent Offices should not be responsible for examining the
morality of HESC inventions; instead, these decisions should be left to
separate special organization, such as the Ethics Committee. Therefore, this
Article argues that it would be more economically viable to implement
specific legal regulations applicable to HESC research than to include a
general moral exclusion in the patent law.
This Article presents moral concerns surrounding HESC patenting in
three parts. Part I explores the incongruous interpretations of moral
standards and “industrial or commercial use” in EU case law. The
inconsistent interpretation of moral provisions has resulted in controversy
and confusion in the patentability of HESC-related inventions, which
would certainly become a barrier to technological progress. Part II
Stem Cell Research: An Administrative Analysis, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 855, 858, 883 (2000)
(using the “Chevron Two-Step” to analyze the Department of Health and Human Services’
interpretation of federal law governing stem cell research funding).
20. §§ 101-103.
21. See Gross, supra note 19.
22. National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell
Research, Volume 1 Report and Recommendations of the National Advisory Commission
(Sept. 13, 1999), available at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/nbac/stemcell.pdf.
23. See Michael J. Malinowsk & Nick Littlefield, Transformation of a Research
Platform Into Commercial Products: The Impact of US Federal Policy on Biotechnology,
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF GENETIC RESEARCH: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 80,
80 (Timothy A. Caulfield & Bryn Williams-Jones eds., 1st ed. 1999).
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examines the effect of moral provisions in the Chinese patent system. The
vast interpretive scope left by China’s moral provision makes this provision
confusing and controversial. The uncertain interpretation regarding
morality and patentability of HESC-related invention results in poor
supervision of HESC research. Part III discusses the developing policies of
HESC research in the U.S. Instead of moral exclusion in patentability, the
U.S. regulates and controls federal funding. The federal funding control of
HESC research may provide an alternative approach to patent control.
Moreover, the inconsistent policies adopted by different administrations
leave the patentability of HESC-related inventions vulnerable to market
demands. Through a detailed, section-by-section comparison of each
approach adopted in these three areas, this Article demonstrates that moral
exclusion is unnecessary in patent law.
I. THE EUROPEAN UNION: INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATIONS OF MORAL
PROVISIONS IN PATENT LAW
The EU regulation of HESC research related to moral concerns infuses
patent examination with a moral assessment.24 Despite many scholars’ and
legal practitioners’ belief that patent law is not the proper vehicle for
enforcing morality and that patent examiners are not moral experts,25 the
EU patent-granting agencies are responsible for interpreting moral
provisions.26 European Biotechnology Directive 98/44/EC explicitly states
that inventions that involve the “use[] of human embryos for industrial or
commercial purpose” cannot be patented. 27 However, the question
24. See Article 53(a) of European Patent Convention (stating “European patents shall
not be granted in respect of (a) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality”).
25. See Leland Stanford/MODIFIED ANIMALS, 2002 EPOR 2, at point 51 (stating the
Opposition Division of European Patent Office has noticed this difference and commented
that “it cannot be the role of the EPO to act as a moral censor and invoke the provisions of
Article 53(a) EPC to refuse on ethical grounds to grant a patent on legal research and
directed to an invention indisputably associated with medical benefits”); see William
Cornish, David Llewelyn, &Tanya Aplin, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT,
TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 881 (7th ed. 2010) (pointing out that morality and patent
law should be divided because patent system is not an appropriated arena for moral
discussion); see also Julia Black, Regulation as Facilitation: Negotiating the Genetic
Revolution, 61 MOD. L. REV. 621, 649 (1998) (stating that the objective, technical and legal
nature of patent law is contrary to the morality that is inherently “malleable, subjective and
emotive”).
26. See Relaxin/Howard Florey Institute, T 0272/95 [2002] EPOR; see also Plant
Genetic Systems/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors, T356/93 [1995] EPOR 361;
HARVARD/Onco-mouse, T19/90, [1990].
27. Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998
on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. 42, 1998 O.J. (L 213).
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remains: how should the law assess morality along with the scope of the
industrial or commercial use referenced in the Directive?
A. How to assess the morality?
At the EU level, the European Patent Convention contains a morality
clause that excludes patenting immoral inventions,28 whereas the morality
standard developed in case law has established inconsistent standards (i.e.,
“abhorrence” versus “unacceptability”).
1. Howard Florey/Relaxin: the “abhorrence” standard with rebuttable
presumption approach
The “abhorrence” standard is drawn from Howard Florey/Relaxin, 29
which considers a patent application related to the DNA sequence coding
for relaxin—the unexpected second form of the human hormone that helps
relax the uterus during childbirth and reduce the need for Cesarean
sections.30 The patent was initially granted in 1991, but the Green Party
opposed it in the European Parliament. One of the Green Party’s primary
objections was that the issuance of the patent was contrary to morality.31
The Opposition Division of the Patent Office first cited the “abhorrence”
standard established in the Plant Genetic Systems case.32 The Opposition
Division then established a “rebuttable presumption” 33 approach to the
“abhorrence” standard.34 Based on this standard, the Relaxin patent did not
28. Article 53(a) of European Patent Convention (stating that “[e]uropean patents shall
not be granted in respect of . . . inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality”).
29. Relaxin, 1995 OJ EPO 388 (Opposition Div. 1994) (holding that the the test for the
abhorrence standard is whether it is probable that the general public would find the
invention so abhorrent that granting patent rights would be inconceivable.).
30. See F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTENTRICS 41 (Dwight Rouse et al,
eds., 22d ed. 2005) (explaining the role of relaxin to “promote uterine vascular vasodilation
and myometrial smooth muscle relaxation); see generally R. Stephen Crespi, The Human
Embryo and Patent Law—A Major Challenge Ahead?, 28 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 569
(2006) (discussing the effect of developing biotechnologies on the patent laws in
industrialized countries).
31. Case T-0272/95, Relaxin/Howard Florey Institute, [2002] EPOR (summarizing that
the Green Party opposed the European patent 112.149 that was granted to the Howard
Florey Institute of Experimental Physiology and Medicine for human H-2 relaxin, a
hormone involved in reproduction, and a DNA sequence coding for the hormone).
32. Case T-356/93, Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] EPOR (“It would
undoubtedly be against ‘ordre public’ or morality to propose a misuse or destructive use of
these [genetic engineering] techniques.”).
33. See Yan Min, Morality —An Equivocal Area in the Patent System, 34 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 261, 263 (2012).
34. See Relaxin, 1995 OJ EPO 388 (holding that “[a] fair test to apply is to consider
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go against “widely-accepted moral standards of behavior”, therefore, the
Green Party’s morality objection is invalid.35
This decision applies the general principle of narrowly interpreting the
exclusion of patentability. 36 When the opponent requested to conduct a
public survey of “what would be patentable,” the Opposition Division
refused to issue it and indicated that the EPO is not the proper organization
to determine fundamental moral questions.37 Therefore, to some extent,
the “abhorrence” standard is much lower than the “unacceptability”
standard discussed below.
2. Harvard/Onco-mouse: The “unacceptability” standard
The “unacceptability” standard is mainly implied in the “Onco-mouse”
case, which involves the patentability of genetically modified mice that are
useful in cancer research.38 In 1992, the Examining Division granted the
Onco-mouse patent,39 which was then challenged on the ground that the
invention violated the morality requirement of Article 53(a) of the
European Patent Convention (EPC).40 The Technical Appeal Board (TBA)
cited the “unacceptability” definition in Plant Genetic Systems v.
Greenpeace as the possible reason for unpatentability. 41 The TBA
therefore developed the “unacceptability” standard, which balances the
“acceptable suffering” and “unacceptable suffering.”42 The analysis from
this balancing test in this case weighed in favor of patentability due to the
invention’s massive benefits.
whether it is probable that the public in general would regard the invention as so abhorrent
that the grant of patent rights would be inconceivable. If it is clear that this is the case,
objection should be raised under Article 53(a); otherwise not”).
35. See Yan Min, supra note 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. For a rationale of the Directive, see Crespi, supra note 30, at 571.
37. See R. v. Leland Stanford/MODIFIED ANIMALS, [2002] EPOR 2 (Opposition Div.
2001). at point 51 (stating the Opposition Division of European Patent Office has
commented that “it cannot be the role of the EPO to act as a moral censor and invoke the
provisions of Article 53(a) EPC to refuse on ethical grounds to grant a patent on legal
research and directed to an invention indisputably associated with medical benefits”).
38. Case T-19/90, Onco-mouse/HARVARD (EPO 1990).
39. Eur. Patent No. 0 169 672 A1 (filed June 24, 1985) (detailing the method for
producing transgenic animals).
40. See Article 53(a).
41. See Case T-356/93, Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] EPOR 16 (stating
that “the concept of morality is related to the belief that some behavior is right and
acceptable, whereas other behavior is wrong, and this belief is founded on the totality of the
accepted norms that are deeply rooted in a particular culture”).
42. Case T-315/03, Transgenic animal/Harvard, [2005] EPOR 2, 8, 17 (explaining
how the TBA weighs the suffering of animals and possible risks to the environment and the
invention’s usefulness to mankind).
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The EPO has therefore developed two moral standards: a balancing test
to determine whether the “unacceptability” standard applies as well as a
rebuttable presumption that the “abhorrence” standard applies. The
“abhorrence” standard provides minimum morality-based protections. 43
The “unacceptability” standard is frequently implicated in patent
applications related to life.44 The EPO can adopt different moral standards
during the initial examination and the appeal stages of a human
biotechnology patent application. 45
The two above-mentioned
methodologies are fundamentally different: “the ‘balancing exercise’
incorporate[s] diverse issues in direct competition to each other;”
conversely, “the ‘rebuttable presumption’ [examines] a raft of issues to
determine if any one of them [constitutes] an ‘abhorrence.’” 46 The
distinction between these two standards is significant because “under the
‘balancing exercise’ all of the issues considered form part of the reason
why the invention is patentable or not:
whereas the ‘rebuttable
presumption’ approach identifies a single issue upon which the decision
rests.” 47 In the foreseeable future, the equivocal interpretations of the
moral provision in patent law will be a barrier to the great medical
potential.48
3. Plant Genetic Systems v. Greenpeace: The conflict between
“abhorrence” standard and “unacceptability” standard
Both the “abhorrence” and “unacceptability” standards are discussed and
43. See Margo A. Bagley, A Global Controversy: The Role of Morality in
Biotechnology Patent Law, 57 U. VA. L. SCH. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER
SERIES 332, 333, 335 (2007) (commenting that this “unacceptability” standard is certainly a
lower hurdle for an invention to overcome than the balancing test); see also Min, supra note
33 at 264.
44. See Min, supra note 33 at 264 (explaining how this standard most likely applies to
animal and plant biotechnology).
45. Amanda Warren-Jones, Finding a “Common Morality Codex” For Biotech—A
Question of Substance, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 638, 652-53 (2008).
46. Id. at 653.
47. Id. (observing that the difference between the two standards can be the difference
between the patentee being able to resolve the problem by amending the claim or having to
consign the invention to ignominy).
48. See Min, supra note 33 at 265 (commenting that “[t]his is because, on one hand,
the so-called morality exception is favoured by the Greens, animal welfare activists and
environmentalists as a powerful weapon against biotechnology inventions, and consequently
they prefer a stricter moral standard which is in stark contrast to the proponents of genetic
engineering who prefer a loose standard; and on the other hand, in contemporary society
there are few, if any, inventions so obviously immoral as to raise little difficulty in denying
a grant of patent on the ground of morality”).
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applied in Plant Genetic Systems. This case involved the application for a
patent in glutamine synthetase inhibitors that help plants and seeds resist
weeds and fungal diseases. 49 The granted patent was challenged by
Greenpeace, which argued that it created serious environmental risks.50
The Opposition Division initially refused to exercise the balancing test
established in the Onco-mouse case by claiming that the “unacceptability”
standard is not the only way to assess patentability.51 Because the moral
provision acts as an emergency safeguard, the Opposition Division further
stated that patents should not be granted for inventions that are universally
regarded as outrageous.52 The reason that the Opposition Division adopted
the “abhorrence” standard instead of the “unacceptability” balancing test
was that “balancing does not even come into play unless concrete societal
disadvantages of the invention are presented.”53 Therefore, the Opposition
Division held that only “in those very limited cases in which there is an
overwhelming consensus that the exploitation of an invention would be
immoral may an invention be excluded from patentability under Article
53(a).”54
By contrast, the TBA seems to apply the “unacceptability” rather than
the “abhorrence” standard. Based on the interpretation of morality by the
TBA, 55 an assessment of morality cannot possibly be achieved by
balancing benefits and disadvantages because there is no sufficient
evidence of true benefits or disadvantages. 56 However, the possibility
49. Case T-356/93, Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] EPOR 24.
50. Id. at 8 (explaining that “[t]he exploitation of the present invention resulted in
serious, irreversible environmental risks: the treated plants themselves could become weeds;
Herbicide-resistance could spread to other plants; [and] the ecosystems could be damaged”).
51. Id. at 12 (disclosing that the Opposition Division found that the “invention did not
belong to the category of inventions which the public in general would have regarded as
being so abhorrent or so dangerous that the grant of patent rights should have been
inconceivable. The EPO should apply the exclusions from patentability under Article 53(a)
EPC only in such extreme cases”).
52. See id.; see also Amanda Warren-Jones, Vital Parameters for Patent Morality—A
Question of Form, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 832, 837 n.31 (2007).
53. See Bagley, supra note 43 at 333.
54. See Warren-Jones, supra note 45 at 642.
55. See Case T-356/93, Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] EPOR (TBA) at 16
(explaining that due to the nature of the EPC, the TBA historically explained “the concept of
morality is related to the belief that some behavior is right and acceptable whereas other
behaviour is wrong, this belief being founded on the totality of the accepted norms that are
deeply rooted in a particular culture”).
56. Id. at 18 (“In the present case, since no sufficient evidence of actual disadvantages
has been adduced, the assessment of patentability with regard to Article 53(a) EPC may not
be based on the so-called ‘balancing exercise’ of benefits and disadvantages, as submitted
by the Appellants. The Board observes that such a ‘balancing exercise’ is not the only way
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remains that a morality assessment could involve assessing potential
benefits and disadvantages. Different from the Onco-mouse case where the
environmental risk is an appropriate consideration for unacceptable patent,
in Plant Genetic Systems, the Board found “the possibility of risks
traditionally has no bearing on whether a patent is granted or not.”57
The above analysis shows that the EPO conducts moral assessments
inconsistently, leading to a cycle of misapplication. Even in the EPO’s
decisions, two competing standards, “abhorrence” and “unacceptability,”
may be applied. Moreover, this dual system provides no clear guidance on
which approach is appropriate in any particular case.58 This confusion is
well demonstrated in Plant Genetic Systems because it would apply the
“rebuttable presumption” approach to the “abhorrence” standard. The only
remaining issue would be “how this standard and methodology are to
operate in practice [which would] require[] an analysis of the evidence
[that] forms the basis of the decision.”59 Amanda Warren-Jones, a legal
scholar from University of Sheffield, advances three arguments to favor the
abhorrence approach.60 While alternatively, it may be improper to balance
issues involving human-beings from either an ethical or an evidentiary
perspective.61
B. Whether HESC-related inventions should be included in “human
embryo?” What is the scope of “industrial or commercial use?”
Another enduring ambiguous aspect of morality is commercial
exploitation. The scope of the “industrial or commercial use” in Article
53(a) of the EPC determines the arena for the moral assessment. In patent
examination, morality is capable of being determined only if commercial
of assessing patentability with regard to Article 53(a) EPC, but just one possible way,
perhaps useful in situations in which an actual damage and/or disadvantage (e.g. suffering of
animals as in the case of decision T 19/90) exists.”).
57. Id. at 31.
58. Warren-Jones, supra note 45, at 654 (analyzing this issue and arguing that “only
one defensible approach . . . offers cohesion in the European patent system”).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 653 (arguing that first, unlike the “unacceptability” standard that covers all
issues related to whether a patent should be granted, the “abhorrence” standard focuses on a
single issue on which to base a decision. Second, “it is not possible to weigh competing
issues to determine ‘abhorrence’ because [that concept] is an absolute that does not permit
fine [logical distinctions] in the way that ‘unacceptability’ does.” Third, the EPO has
already identified cases involving “abhorrent” inventions. Only when such examinations are
appealed based on that issue might a decision be reversed).
61. Id. at 654-61 (noting that “[t]he President in the WARF case pointed out that
adoption of a ‘balancing exercise’ at the initial examination stage imposes an ethical
assessment beyond the ability and mandate of patent offices”).
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exploitation has been assured.62
1. University of Edinburgh: A broad approach by the Opposition Division
on the interpretation of “human embryos”
The scope of the exclusion of the “use of human embryos for industrial
or commercial use” was first addressed in University of Edinburgh/Stem
Cell Isolation. 63 That case involved a European patent held by the
University of Edinburgh’s Austin Smith and Peter Mountford and
addressed methods of selecting for animal stem cells (including HESC).64
To further complicate matters, a term used in the patent claim referred to
animals, but did not exclude humans. 65 Accordingly, fourteen parties
opposed the patent, including those of Germany and the Netherlands,
because it might cover HESC, not just animal stem cells. Those parties
filed in the Opposition Division66 on the ground that granting the patent
would violate Article 53(a) of the EPC.67
The Opposition Division distinguished between fact and opinion and
finally concluded that, based on the Biotechnology Directive, HESCrelated inventions derived from destruction of human embryos are not
patentable.68 First, the Opposition Division acknowledged two opposing
views concerning the scope of the term “human embryo,” as used in Article
53(a) of the EPC: the narrow interpretation was understood to mean
“human embryos” and the broad interpretation was understood to mean
“human embryos together with the cells retrieved from the destruction of
those embryos—namely, human ES cells.”69 Next, the Opposition Division
noted that Article 53(a) of the EPC is equivalent to Article 6(2) of the

62. Warren-Jones, supra note 2, at 447 (observing that “[e]xamination at the patenting
stage requires that morality be determined before exploitation has become assured[, and
that] it is [therefore] inevitable that any assessment at such an early stage in the invention’s
commercial development will entail some considerations which will consequentially prove
superfluous”).
63. Case T-1079/03, University of Edinburgh/Stem Cell Isolation (Edinburgh), EP
949131742 unreported, July 21, 2003, Opposition Division.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998
on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. [1998] 42 OJ EPO (L 213)
(stating within the preamble of the Council Directive that European patents should not be
granted for inventions involving “uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial
purposes”).
68. University of Edinburgh/Stem Cell Isolation (Edinburgh), T-1079/03 EP
949131742 unreported, July 21, 2003, Opposition Division.
69. Crespi, supra note 30, at 572.
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Directive. 70 The interpretation of the Directive towards the morality of
HESC-related inventions, as set forth in its recitals, is that HESC fall
within the scope of the term “human embryo.” 71 Thus, the Opposition
Division held that the broad interpretation was appropriate.
With regard to the term “industrial or commercial use,” the Opposition
Division stressed that “use” of HESC-related invention should be
considered patenting in the event that such invention is morally
acceptable. 72 In University of Edinburgh/Stem Cell Isolation, the
application refers to using HESC which were obtained by destroying
human embryos; since using HESCs was ethically unacceptable, it is
unnecessary to consider patenting the “use” of such invention. Under the
Opposition Division’s ruling, it is also immoral to use spare embryos from
in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) procedures and embryos created for research
since both involve the destruction of human embryos.73
However, a former board of Appeal Member at the EPO, Claudio
Germinario, expressed a different opinion; specifically, that to conform to a
previous TBA ruling, the term “human embryo” in Article 6(2) of the
Directive should be interpreted narrowly.74 He pointed out that “the scope
70. Council Directive 98/44/EC, art. 6, 1998 O.J. (L 213) (EC). The directive provides:
“Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to be so
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation . . . . On the basis of paragraph
one, the following, in particular, shall be considered unpatentable: (a) processes for cloning
human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings;
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; and (d) processes for
modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without
any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such
processes.” Compare id. with Article 53(a) European Patent Convention; see University of
Edinburgh/Stem Cell Isolation (Edinburgh), T-1079/03 EP 949131742 unreported, July 21,
2003, Opposition Division, at 22.
71. Recital 16 of the Directive provides that “it is important to assert the principle that
the human body, at any stage in its formation or development, including germ cells, and the
simple discovery of one of its elements or one of its products, including the sequence or
partial sequence of a human gene, cannot be patented.” Council Directive 98/44/EC, ¶ 16,
1998 O.J. (L 213) (EC).
72. University of Edinburgh/Stem Cell Isolation (Edinburgh), T-1079/03 EP
949131742 unreported, July 21, 2003, Opposition Division (stating that if the patenting of a
product is ethically unacceptable, it is hardly conceivable that the patenting of “uses” of this
product could be judged differently).
73. Id.
74. Claudio Germinario, The Value of Life, 163 PATENT WORLD 16, 18 (2004) (arguing
that the function of the patent claims in defining the scope of protection provides a practical
workable solution to these issues. Thus insofar as the actual claims themselves do no
encompass any reference to the embryo or preceding step in which the embryo is actually
used).
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of the protection conferred by a patent is given by the wording of the
claims interpreted.”75 He believed that since the destruction process was
not claimed, patenting HESCs was not not a violation even though these
cells were derived from human embryo.76 He further stated that if HESCs
are “available through importation or from many other sources,” the patent
application does not necessarily include “the prohibited stage of producing
the first generation of freshly disaggregated embryonic cells.”77 Therefore,
no moral prohibition should be used against using the imported human ES
cells.78
2. Use of embryos/WARF (G2/06): The landmark ruling by the European
Patent Office (EPO) patenting HESC
WARF addressed the same questions as University of Edinburgh.79 This
case involved a European patent application by the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation (WARF) titled “Primate embryonic stem cells,”
covering the derivation and cultures of pluripotent embryonic stem cell
lines. 80 The patent description shows that WARF’s claims address
inventions obtained through a method that involves destroying human
embryos.81 Although the application does not directly claim that method,
human embryos are inevitably destroyed because the method is the only
way to obtain the invention. 82 In 2004, the EPO’s Examining Division
denied the application. 83 The examiners held that the claims violated
Article 53(a), in conjunction with Rule 28(c) of EPC 2000,84 because “as
75. Id.
76. Id. (stating that although admittedly any such process must begin with the
destruction of a human embryo this would appear to be immaterial to the patenting of the
process and cell lines thus obtained in so far as the prohibited step is not claimed.).
77. Id.
78. Id. (applying his analysis to the University of Edinburgh case).
79. See generally Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306.
80. Eur. Pat. App. No. 96,903,521 published as EP0770125 (claiming that a cell
culture comprising primate embryonic stem cells that “(i) are capable of proliferation in an
in vitro culture for over one year, (ii) maintain a karyotype in which all chromosomes
normally characteristic of the primate species are present and are not noticeably altered by
the culturing, (iii) maintain the potential throughout the culture to differentiate into
derivatives of endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm tissues, and (iv) are prevented from
differentiating when cultured on a fibroblast feeder layer.”).
81. Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06, [2009] 5 OJ EPO, at 308 (EPO Enlarged Broad of
Appeal 2009).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 309.
84. See id.; see also Implementing Regulations, European Patent Convention, Nov. 29,
2000, Rule 28(c) (providing that “[u]nder Article 53(a), European patents shall not be
granted in respect of biotechnological Inventions which, in particular, concern the
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regards the generation of human embryonic stem cell cultures, the use of
human embryos as starting material was described in the application as
originally filed as being indispensable.”85 Although the patent application
did not directly claim human embryos, the invention is related to them and
exclusively relies on them.86 The examiners also concluded that the use of
human embryos as a starting material is a use for industrial purposes within
the scope of Rule 28(c) of the EPC 2000, and therefore could not be
patented.87
The decision was appealed and turned over to the Board of Appeals in
2004.88 However, the Board did not rectify the decision and referred four
questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA).89 The first question is
procedural and concerns the effective time of Rule 28(c).90 Regardless of
the answer to that question, the requirements of Article 53(a) should be met
beyond Rule 28(c).91 The second and third questions referred to the main
issue in the case: the patentability of inventions involving the destruction
of human embryos. The core argument in the case related to the proper
approach for interpreting the phrase “use human embryos for industrial or
commercial use.”92 The fourth question related to whether the decision in
this case was binding when the method for which the patent was sought
was capable of being accomplished without destroying human embryos as
of the filing date.93
In 2008, the EBA answered the four questions and decided that no patent
following: . . . c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes”).
85. Use of embryos/WARF, 5 OJ EPO at 309.
86. Eur. Pat. App. No. 96,903,521 published as EP0770125.
87. Use of embryos/WARF, 5 OJ EPO at 327-28.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 307-08 (stating that four questions are: “(1) Does Rule 28(c) EPC extend to
patent applications whose claimed subject-matter comprises a product derived from human
embryos? (2) If the answer to question 1 is yes, does Rule 23d(c) [now 28(c)] EPC forbid
the patenting of claims directed to products (here: human embryonic stem cell cultures)
which – as described in the application - at the filing date could be prepared exclusively by a
method which necessarily involved the destruction of the human embryos from which the
said products are derived, if the said method is not part of the claims? (3) If the answer to
question 1 or 2 is no, does Article 53(a) EPC forbid patenting such claims? (4) In the
context of questions 2 and 3, is it of relevance that after the filing date the same products
could be obtained without having to recur to a method necessarily involving the destruction
of human embryos (here: e.g. derivation from available human embryonic cell lines)?”).
90. Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306.
91. Id. at 321-22 (noting that Rule 23d(c) contains the same wording as Article 53(a)
EPC, which took effect in 1973).
92. Ewan Nettleton, EPO’s Enlarged Board Rules on Patenting Stem Cell Inventions, 4
J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 306, 307 (2009).
93. Use of embryos/WARF, G2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306.
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would be granted on inventions related to the destruction of human
embryos.94 First, the EBA affirmed that Rule 28(c) is retroactive to patent
applications prior to enforcement. 95 Second, the EBA stated that the
rationale underlying Rule 28(c) is “the prohibition of the misuse or
commodification of embryos.” 96 The exclusion of Rule 28(c) listed in
Recital 42 of the Directive applies only when human embryos are used for
a “therapeutic or diagnostic purpose.” 97 The EBA further held that
legislators deliberately declined to provide either a precise definition or a
restricted interpretation of the term “embryo.” 98 With respect to the
appellant’s allegation that the claim does not cover human embryo
destruction, the EBA identified the term used in Rule 28(c) as an
“invention,” not a “claim.”99 The HESC derivation method disclosed in the
description involved the destruction of the embryo.100 Since the destruction
of the embryo is an “essential and integral” part of the invention, the use of
the human embryos is for “industrial or commercial exploitation.”101 The
appellant attempted to defend its destruction of human embryos as not for
“industrial or commercial use.”102 However, the EBA disagreed and noted
that human embryo destruction is one step of the manufacturing procedure
described in the claim. 103 Creating an invention that inevitably destroys
94. Id.
95. Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 5 OJ EPO at 322.
96. Id. at 323-24.
97. Council Directive No. 98/44/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 213) 13, 16 (providing that
“whereas, moreover, uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes must
also be excluded from patentability; whereas in any case such exclusion does not affect
inventions for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes that are applied to the human embryo and
are useful to it”).
98. Use of embryos/WARF, 5 OJ EPO at 325.
99. Id. at 326 (stating that “this Rule (as well as the corresponding provision of the
Directive) does not mention claims, but refers to “invention” in the context of its
exploitation. What needs to be looked at is not just the explicit wording of the claims but the
technical teaching of the application as a whole as to how the invention is to be performed.
Before human embryonic stem cell cultures can be used they have to be made. Since in the
case referred to the Enlarged Board the only teaching of how to perform the invention to
make human embryonic stem cell cultures is the use (involving their destruction) of human
embryos, this invention falls under the prohibition of Rule 28(c)”).
100. Id. at 327 (finding that the destruction of the human embryo under the derivation
method is an integral and essential part of the industrial or commercial exploitation of the
claimed invention and thus violates the prohibition of Rule 28(c)).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 329 (“[I]t is important to point out that it is not the fact of the patenting itself
that is considered to be against the ordre public or morality, but it is the performing of the
invention, which includes a step (the use involving its destruction of a human embryo) that
has to be considered to contravene those concepts.”); see Council Directive No. 98/44/EC,
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human embryos is one type of commercial exploitation. The patentability
criterions apply to all steps of inventions. Since the invention covered the
step that involved the destruction of human embryo, the patent application
was rejected for its violation of the morality provisions.104 Third, the EBA
indicated its decision had no influence over the patentability of general
inventions relating to human stem cells or human stem-cell cultures.105
This case represents a rare instance in which an appellant requested the
European Patent Convention (EPO) refer a patent question to the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) for the reason that Rule 28(c) is the same as Article
6(2)(c) of the Directive.106 It is rare because “the Boards of Appeal of the
EPO are not courts or tribunals of a member state of the EU, and there is no
power under the EPC for a Board of Appeal to refer questions to the
ECJ.” 107 However, neither the EPC nor the Implementing Regulations
grant any authority to refer questions of law to the European Court of
Justice.108 The conjunction of Rule 28(c) of EPC with Article 6(2)(c) of the
Directive did not compel the conclusion that “the European Court of Justice
now has jurisdiction to decide matters for the European Patent Office under
the European Patent Convention.”109 The Biotechnology Directive should
be used by the EPO only as a supplementary method of interpretation, not
as a direct source.110 Therefore, the EBA believed that the EPO should not
seek ECJ guidance.
The EBA’s decision has had a significant and profound influence on the
field of HESC research. It has removed doubt on some fundamental issues
and built a foundation of legal certainty for Rule 28(c).111 It unveiled the
1997 O.J. (L 213) 39 (“Whereas ordre public and morality correspond in particular to ethical
or moral principles recognized in a member state, respect for which is particularly important
in the field of biotechnology in view of the potential scope of inventions in this field and
their inherent relationship to living matter; whereas such ethical or moral principles
supplement the standard legal examinations under patent law regardless of the technical
field of the invention.”).
104. See Use of embryos/WARF, G 2/06 [2009] 5 OJ EPO 306.
105. Id. at 312.
106. See Rule 28 of EPC (providing that “under Article53(a), European patents shall not
be granted in respect of biotechnological inventions which, in particular, concern the
following: (a) processes for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ
line genetic identity of human beings; (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or
commercial purposes; (d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are
likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and
also animals resulting from such processes”).
107. WARF, G2/06 at 6.
108. Id. G2/06 at 3.
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id.
111. Min, supra note 33.
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moral dilemma in patentability of HESC-related inventions and leaves
space for evaluating the scope of Rule 28(c).112 Some scientists predicted
that the decision would encourage European companies to develop new
HESC technology because the old technology is not patentable.113
3. Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace: The decision by European Court of
Justice on patenting HESC
The ECJ and the EPO have similar concerns regarding the patentability
of inventions involving human-embryo destruction. In Oliver Brüstle v.
Greenpeace,114 the ECJ addressed the same two questions as the WARF
case—namely the definition of the term “human embryos” and the scope of
“industrial or commercial use” under Article 6(2) of the Directive—before
concluding that the invention was not patentable.115 The case involved a
patent that had been overturned by the German Federal Patent Court. 116
The patent claims did not cover the production of HESC, but its methods of
obtaining the cells were inevitably related to human-embryo destruction.117
However, unlike the situation in WARF, the HESC in this case had been
obtained from existing HESC lines, consistent with German Embryo
Protection Act.118
On March 10, 2011, the court concluded that, regardless of whether the
description contained any reference to the use of embryos, the invention is
not patentable since the patent “necessitates the prior destruction of human
embryos.”119 The decision, authored by Judge Bot, appears to bring trouble
112. See, e.g., Pierre Treichel, Case Comment G2/06 and the Verdict of Immorality, 40
INT’L. REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 450, 450 (2009) (positing an interpretation of
prohibiting patents for “all the possible variants of the prohibited inventions in different
circumstances”).
113. See James Randerson, Europe Rejects Patent Governing Use of Embryonic Stem
Cells,
The
Guardian
(Nov.
27
2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2008/nov/27/embryonic-stem-cells-patent
(discussing
the implication the decision has on companies that develop technologies based on human
embryonic stem cells).
114. Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV. 200 E.C.R. I-09821 (2011).
115. See id. at 23 (outlining two of the main questions in the case in determining
whether the invention is patentable).
116. German Patent No. DE 19756864 C5.
117. See id. (claiming the isolation and purification of precursor cells generated from
embryonic stem cells and explaining that embryonic stem cells emerge from pluripotent
stem cells in the very early stages of the development of a fetus).
118. The Embryo Protection Act, Federal Law Gazette, pt. 1 no. 69 (1991); see also Jan
P. Beckmann, On the German Debate on Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 29 J.
MED. & PHIL. 603-21 (discussing Germany’s allowance of HESC research based on the
existing HESC lines).
119. Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., 8 (March 10, 2011),
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beyond the patentability issue.120 For example, the ruling might encourage
other countries to adopt restrictive approach or total bans on the research.121
Some scholars have commented that the decision is too restrictive.122 They
further state that without patent protection, the medical stem-cell industry
will lose its incentive to develop HESC-based therapies.123 Some existing
achievements, developed through research under the European
Commission and various EU member states, would also be nullified by a
ban on patentability.124 Finally, these commentators express hope that the
ECJ’s Grand Chamber “deliberate on the full implications before making a
legally binding ruling.”125
The ECJ’s Grand Chamber ruled against patentability on October 18,
2011. 126 The ECJ held that even already-existing HESC have been
harvested from human embryos.127 Therefore, inventions involving either
newly derived HESC or HESC obtained from established stem cell lines
are excluded from patentability. 128 Moreover, “use for industrial or
commercial purposes” under Article 6(2) includes the use of human
embryos for scientific research. 129 Austin Smith, 130 who wrote a letter
criticizing the March 10th decision, complained that, “we are funded to do
research for the public good, yet prevented from taking our discoveries to

http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=81836&pageIndex=0&doc
lang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=99614.
120. Id. (stating that “the exclusion from patentability concerning the use of human
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes [set out in Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive
98/44] also covers the use of human embryos for purposes of scientific research,” only use
of therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which is applied to the human embryo and is useful to
it being patentable).
121. See Alison Abbott, Europe Rules Against Stem-Cell Patents: Work with Human
Embryonic Stem Cells is ‘Contrary to Ethics,’ 471 NATURE 280, 281 (2011).
122. See id. at 281 (remarking that the opinion placed too much emphasis on cell-line
origin and thus ignored the time at which a line has been established).
123. Id.
124. Austin Smith, No to Ban on Stem Cell Patents 472 Nature 418 (2011) (listing drug
development and cell-replacement therapy as examples of achievements that would be
nullified by a ban on patentability).
125. Id.
126. Case C-34/10, Brüstle v Greenpeace, 2011 E.C.R. I-9849, I-9876-77 (holding that
“the exclusion from patentability concerning the use of human embryos . . . also covers the
use of human embryos for the purposes of scientific research”).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at I-9877 (holding that only uses for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes are not
barred from patent under Article 6(2)).
130. See Smith, supra note 125 (Austin Smith is affiliated with the Welcome Trust
Centre for Stem Cell Research at the University of Cambridge).
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the market place where they could be developed into new medicines.”131
The verdict might have the unfortunate effect of driving stem cell scientists
out of Europe and blocking the development of some therapies derived
from stem cells.
From the Brüstle ruling, we can conclude that the EU has erected a
barrier to patenting HESC-related inventions. Moral considerations are
deeply rooted in the EU—even in the UK, which has liberal policies
towards HESC research.132 Despite the huge efforts made in the HESC
regulations, there remains an inconsistency related to whether a moral
examination is properly an element of patent law. 133 The ECJ and the
EPO’s dual system of assessing morality standards has resulted in legal
uncertainty. Therefore, we should reconsider how far patent law can
accommodate the morality issues. This article argues, the EPO should not
take the responsibility of examining the morality of HESC inventions: it
would be better to leave such decisions to the Ethics Committee.134
II CHINA: INCONSISTENT MORAL STANDARDS BETWEEN PATENT LAW AND
PRACTICAL APPLICATION

Compared to the EU, China’s policy on HESC-related research and
applications is relatively liberal and supported by Chinese culture and
values. 135 Because the Chinese people have reached a consensus that
abortion is legal, in China, embryos are not typically treated as persons.136
131. Emma, European Court Bans Stem-Cell Patents, EURO STEM CELL (Oct. 18, 2011)
http://www.eurostemcell.org/node/21554.
132. See Department of Health & Social Security, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (“The Warnock Report”) (1984),
available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2068.html (providing a dissenting view from those in
the UK who believe the human embryo has a special status and should not be used for
research,). But see Aurora Plomer, Beyond the HFE Act 1990: The Regulation of Stem Cell
Research in the UK, 10 MED. L. REV. 132, 133 (2002) (“The UK currently stands alone in
Europe in permitting the creation of human embryos specifically for research purposes,
including the use of cloning techniques.”).
133. See Laurie, supra note 2, at 61 (“[D]espite the fact that disquiet and discussions of
an ethic nature held up the adoption of the biotechnology Directive for so long, it is far from
clear that we are any further forward in developing uniform, logical, principled and
defensible ethical guidelines within European patent law.”).
134. Ethical committee should involve individuals from diverse backgrounds who support
HESC research with three major functions: providing clinical ethics consultation,
developing or revising policies on HESC research, and monitoring research and clinical
ethics.
135. Döring, supra note 15, at 236 (stating that “[t]he Chinese believe in the importance
of individual autonomy, but they also believe that this right of autonomy is guided by social
needs”).
136. Fu Jun Ying & Zhao Yun Hua, Analysis of Related Policy, Funds and Outputs on
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Generally, human embryo use is not considered to be immoral by the
Chinese.137 However, similar to the EPC, the Patent Law of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) also contains a moral prohibition.138 Specifically,
Article 5 of the PRC states that “patent right shall not be granted for
invention-creations that violate the law or social ethics, or harm public
interests.” 139 According to the Commission on Legislative Affairs, the
social morality standard depends on public acceptability.140 If an invention
is accepted by the public and allowed under the moral standard, it can be
patented. 141 Conversely, inventions such as artificial human organs for
non-medical use and human-animal hybrid embryos are non-patentable for
morality reasons.142
A. Whether Article 5 of the patent law excludes inventions related to
HESC?
As shown by the following analysis, HESC differentiation and culturing
methods are both prohibited by the patent law. In addition, preparations of
pre-implantation embryo for therapeutic cloning use are not patentable.
However, inventions related to existing HESC lines are not contrary to
morality under the Article 5 of Patent Law.143
1. Advanced Cell Technology related to the differentiation of HESC and its
culture method: lacking the explanation of “embryo” and “industrial or
commercial purpose”
Advanced Cell Technology’s 144 January 24, 2005 patent application
Stem Cells in China, 15 J. CLINICAL REHABILITATIVE TISSUE ENGINEERING RESEARCH 256,
257 (2011).
137. Liu Lidong, Analysis of the Possibility Apply for Patent of Human Embryonic Stem
Cell, 30 HOSP. MGMT. FORUM 9, 11 (2013).
138. See Article 5 of Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6511.
139. Id.
140. The Development and Morality of Human Embryonic Stem Cell, The State
Intellectual
Property
Office
of
P.R.C,
available
at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/mtjj/2006/200804/t20080401_362185.html.
141. Id.
142. See generally Part II Chapter 1, Guidelines for Patent Examination, State
Intellectual Property Office, People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jan. 21, 2010, effective Feb. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6511 (listing types of inventions for which
no patent can be granted).
143. See id.; see also the patent law of People’s Republic of China, available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/zl/fljxzfg/200812/t20081230_435796.html.
144. See generally Company Overview, ACT: ADVANCED CALL TECHNOLOGY,
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covered methods for improved cell-based therapies for retinal degeneration
and for differentiating HESC. 145 Initially, the claims covered the
differentiation of HESC into retinal pigment epithelial cells used to treat
retinal degeneration. 146 Under Article 5, the patent could not be granted
unless it deleted that claim.147
A similar situation also occurred in the context of Beijing University’s
May 17, 2006 patent application related to a method for culturing HESC in
a special culturing medium. 148 The patent applicant deleted claims
involving HESC culturing before the patent was granted.149 Likewise, the
authorization of a patent application covering methods of preparing feedercell-free, xeno-free HESC and stem-cell cultures specified the elimination
of the HESC culturing methods that had been included in the applicant’s
public specification.150
It is well established in this case that patent could not be granted to the
differentiation of HESC and its culture method. However, neither
“embryo” nor “industrial or commercial purpose” were defined in this case.
Although the Chinese Patent Office encountered the same problems as the
European Office,151 it neither provided any explicit explanation nor offered
http://www.advancedcell.com/about-act/company-overview/ (last visited July 15, 2014)
(giving background on Advanced Cell Technology, Inc., a biotechnology company that
specializes in the development of cellular therapies using stem cell-based technologies).
145. Patent Application No. CN 1968608 A, May 23, 2007, available at
http://www.google.com/patents/CN1968608A?cl=en (claiming methods for improved cellbased therapies for retinal degeneration and for differentiating HESC and human embryoderived retinal cells).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Patent Application No. CN 1844374 A, May 17, 2006, available at
http://www.google.com/patents/CN1844374A?cl=fr (“Culture method for human embryonic
stem cell and special culture medium thereof.”).
149. Id.
150. Patent Application No. CN 100549163C, Oct. 14, 2009, available at
http://www.google.com.tr/patents/CN100549163C?cl=zh-CN (relating to the use of feeder
cells for the method of propagating a culture system and a human embryotic stem cell line);
Patent Application No. CN 1748025A, Mar. 15, 2006, available at
http://www.google.com.tr/patents/CN1748025A?cl=zh-CN (claiming a method of
preparation of feeder cells-free, xeno-free human embryonic stem cells and stem cell
cultures).
151. Brian Salter, Governing Stem Cell Science in China and India: Emerging
Economics and the Global Politics of Innovation, 27 NEW GENETICS & SOCIETY 145, 154
(2008) (stating that with its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001,
China agreed to conform to the requirements of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. Since then China has cooperated frequently with the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO) on
personnel training and promoted IPR teaching and research in over seventy universities); see
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any approach for future judgment.
2. Shanghai Genon Biological Product: HESCs with the possibility of
developing into human being are within the scope of “human embryo”
On November 2 1999, Shanghai Genon Biological Product Co. Ltd.’s
(“Genon”) patent referred to the preparation of pre-implantation embryos
for therapeutic cloning use.152 The publication date of the patent application
was July 11, 2001. 153 In 2003, the PRC’s Intellectual Property Office
(IPO) rejected the application pursuant to Article 5. The decision was
made for the several reasons. First, the method used in the invention
involved mixing a donor nuclear cell and non-mammal cytoplasm derived
from donor oocytes. The reconstructed cell is stimulated and transplanted
into non-human mammals. 154 Finally, the cell is developed into early
embryos, which is contrary to the morality provisions under the Article 5.
The IPO held that because the cell contains complete genetic information,
the early embryo should be identified as a human embryo. The preparation
method for an early embryo is equivalent to human cloning. Therefore, the
invention falls within the moral exclusion of Article 5.155 Second, the IPO
held that the invention was for industrial and commercial purposes, and
therefore violated Article 5. 156 Third, as stated in the patent claim, the

also Tang Huadong and Wang Dapeng, The Analysis of the Patentability of Human
Embryonic Stem Cell, 5 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 52, 54 (2013).
152. Shanghai Genon Biological Product Co. Ltd. became the high and new technology
enterprise in Shanghai, Little Giant Breeding enterprise, important enterprise of feed
industry in Shanghai and the main unit which drafts out the national standard of “[s]pray
dried globin protein powder for feed.” The company has taken on a large number of special
government projects such as an industrialization project of high and new technologies from
National Development and Reform Commission, National Spark Plan, an innovation fund
for medium and small enterprise, domestic cooperation projects in Shanghai, which
“develop agriculture by science and technology projects” in Shanghai, and “four news”
technology projects in Shanghai, available at http://www.cngenon.com/
153. CN
99119951.0,
available
at
http://www.psssystem.gov.cn/sipopublicsearch/search/searchHomesearchIndex.shtml?params=991CFE73D4DF553253D44E119219BF31366856FF4B152226
CAE4DB031259396A.
154. See The 5972 re-examination decision by the patent review committee, available at
http://app.sipo-reexam.gov.cn/reexam_out/searchdoc/decidedetail.jsp?jdh=FS5972&lx=fs;
see also Wu Zhou Min, The 5972 Re-examination Decision by the Patent Review
Committee-the Preparation of Pre-implantation Embryos for Therapeutic Cloning Use,
available at http://www.bioipr.com/biopharma-ipr/1108/.
155. Id.
156. Wu Zhou Min, The 5972 Re-examination Decision by the Patent Review
Committee- the Preparation of Pre-implantation Embryos for Therapeutic Cloning Use,
available at http://www.bioipr.com/biopharma-ipr/1108/.
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resulting embryo would be a human-animal hybrid, which is forbidden by
the patent-examination guidelines.157
In 2004, Genon appealed to the patent review committee making several
arguments.
First, although the embryo includes human genetic
information, the embryo is a human-animal hybrid, not a human embryo.
Thus, the invention is not related to the industrial or commercial use of a
human embryo. 158 Second, the embryo created by this method has no
possibility of becoming human because claims 1-10 of the application
contain no human-cloning steps.159 Third, the invention represented one
aspect of human organ transplantation technology. 160 Therefore, the
invention is properly classified as therapeutic cloning. Neither its aim nor
its method involved human cloning. In conclusion, the invention did not
contravene the law, morality, or the public interest.161
Yet the committee reexamined the patent application and concluded that
the invention is unlawful based on Article 5 for two reasons.162 First, the
nuclei donor’s genetic information had a decisive impact on the cell’s
overall performance. Genon’s patent application contained human nuclei
materials that possessed the characteristics of human cells.163 As claimed
in the patent application, the invention is primarily used for the purpose of
tissue or organ transplantation. If so, the invention could not exclude the
possibility of developing into a human being. However, the committee did
not ignore the possibility that the embryonic cells could exhibit the
characteristics of an animal.164 In that situation, the method still violates
public morality because it changes the genetic identity of a human germ
line. Second, the claim does not exclude the possibility of the early
embryos developing into humans. Genon did not provide any evidence to
prove that the embryos could not develop into human being.165 It has been
speculated that HESC has the legal status of human being since HESC
comes with the possibility of developing into human being. Therefore, the
inventions related to HESC are against public morality under Article 5 of
patent law. The argument in this case seems to provide an interpretation of
“human embryo.” However, many ambiguous aspects remain, especially in

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id; see also Liu Lidong, Analysis of the Possibility Apply for Patent of Human
Embryonic Stem Cell, 30 HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT FORUM 9, 11 (2013).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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how broadly or narrowly to construe the possibility of HESCs developing
into a human being.
3. Case the Regents of the University of California: It is improper to trace
the origin of the world’s first HESC lines; therefore, established stem cell
lines are allowed
The next patent application that we consider was filed by the Regents of
the University of California in 2003 and covered oligodendrocytes derived
from HESC for remyelination and the treatment of spinal-cord injuries.166
The IPO held that this invention violated Articles 5 and 22 of the PCR.167
The committee believed that the patent specification and claims in their
entirety related to HESCs obtained from human embryos, thus violating
social morality through the use of human embryos for industrial or
commercial purposes. In addition, the pluripotent cell derived from nonembryonic tissue required bone marrow or other human or animal tissues
through a surgical method for non-therapeutic purposes. Thus, the
invention could not satisfy the utility standard set forth in Article 22.168
The applicant appealed to the patent review committee on the following
two grounds. First, the HESC aspect of the invention had been removed
from the patent specification, and the cell lines used in the invention belong
to established, mature, already-commercialized HESC lines. 169 Second,

166. See the 42698 re-examination decision of the patent review committee, available at
http://app.sipo-reexam.gov.cn/reexam_out/searchdoc/decidedetail.jsp?jdh=42698&lx=fs.
167. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. of the Seventh Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1992, effective January 1, 1993)
Article 5 http://www.chinatrademarkoffice.com/about/laws2.html#2 (providing that “No
patent right shall be granted for any invention-creation that is contrary to the laws of the
State or social morality or that is detrimental to public interest.”); Patent Law of the
People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Seventh Nat’l
People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1992, effective January 1, 1993) Article 22
http://www.chinatrademarkoffice.com/about/laws2.html#2. (“Any invention or utility model
for which patent right may be granted must possess novelty, inventiveness and practical
applicability. ‘Novelty’ means that, before the date of filing, no identical invention or utility
model has been publicly disclosed in publications in the country or abroad or has been
publicly used or made known to the public by any other means in the country, nor has any
other person filed previously with the patent office an application which described the
identical invention or utility model and was published after the said date of filing.
‘Inventiveness’ means that, as compared with the technology existing before the date of
filing the invention has prominent substantive features and represents a notable progress and
that the utility model has substantive features and represents progress. ‘Practical
Applicability’ means that the invention or utility model can be made or used and can
produce effective results.”).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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the application’s claims explicitly excluded direct decomposition from the
human-embryo or HESC-related technology solution. In addition, the
application had deleted all industrial or commercial uses of human
embryos.170
With respect to Article 5, the applicant argued that the origin of HESC
lines should not be traced in perpetuity. 171 The starting material of the
application consisted of established HESC lines capable of unlimited in
vitro proliferation. In the prior art, there are many ways to obtain mature
and stable HESC lines. Moreover, it is improper to trace the origin of the
world’s first HESC lines. Using established HESC lines could decrease
human-embryo abuse and in turn, limit the use of HESCs to mature strains.
Therefore, the application does not violate Article 5’s social-morality
provision.172
The board recognized that it is inappropriate to trace the origin of HESC
lines, and that using established stem cell lines is allowed by the morality
provisions in the patent law. However, in the following decision 24343
made by the Patent Reexamination Committee, the committee held that
although HESCs could be obtained from commercial channels, the source
of HESCs still rely on the destruction of the human embryo. 173 More
definitively, the culture of HESCs had significant problems like being timeconsuming, difficult to operate, and easy to contaminate. As a result,
established cell lines are not the steady and long-term source of HESC.
Subsequently, the argument that using established HESCs could end the
destruction of human embryo was unrealistic.174
The uncertainty decision promulgated by the Patent Office is due to the
misunderstanding of the moral provision.175 The moral standard as well as
the relevant definition should be clarified and developed as soon as
possible.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. The 24343 re-examination decision of the patent review committee, available at
http://app.sipo-reexam.gov.cn/reexam_out/searchdoc/decidedetail.jsp?jdh=FS24343&lx=fs.
174. Id.
175. See Warren-Jones, supra note 52, at 660 (observing that the lack of consensus in
the supplication of the morality provision suggests that there is a fundamental
misunderstanding regarding the definition and application of the provision. The closer this
analysis gets to achieving an operative understanding of the provision, the greater recourse
to commentators to bridge the gaps in practice).
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B. Low moral status of human embryos in practical application
Contrary to popular assumptions, Chinese people place value on life.176
Based on Confucian philosophy, life begins at birth.177 A human embryo
holds the status of a pre-human being. Accordingly, the moral status of a
human embryo is not equal that of a human-being. Moreover, abortion is
not prohibited and is sometimes compulsory under China’s “one-child
policy.”178 A survey about the moral status of HESC research carried out
in hospitals shows that more than fifty percent of doctors believe that
human embryos are not human beings and that more than seventy percent
of doctors support HESC research.179 Under China’s civil law, civil rights
begin at birth.180 A fetus is not a legal entity: in other words, fetuses are not
human-beings.
Therefore, China’s moral standards are very different from those of
Western countries. Even considering the existence of varying local
circumstances, China has a much lower moral standard related to HESC
research than do Western countries.181
C. High moral status of the human embryo in patent law
The first edition of China’s patent law was drafted with reference to the
patent law of other countries, particularly the UK.182 Article 5 of the Patent
176. Achim Rosemann, Life Without Value? Voices of Embryo Donors for hESC
Research in China, IIAS NEWSLETTER (Winter 2009), at 17 (concluding that “[e]qually
flawed appears the assumption that due to the high number of abortions carried out in the
context of the one-child policy, the value of early forms of human life are generally of low
regard among Chinese people.”).
177. Han
Xin,
The
Ideological
of
Confucius,
available
at
http://www.confuchina.com/10%20lishi/kongzi%20sixiang.htm.
178. Jing-Bao Nie, Behind The Silence. Chinese Voices On Abortion 100, 104 (2005).
179. Qiu Xiang Xing, Gao Zhi Yan, Wang De Yan, Wang Ming Xv, Shen Ming Xian
and Chen Ren Biao, A SURVEY AND DISCUSSION ON ETHICAL ISSUES OF HUMAN EMBRYONIC
STEM CELL RESEARCH, 1 MED. & PHILO. 8 (2004).
180. See General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China
(effective January 1, 1987) Article 9 P.R.C. Laws (providing that “[a] citizen shall have the
capacity for civil rights from birth to death and shall enjoy civil rights and assume civil
obligations in accordance with the law”).
181. See Margaret E. Sleeboom-Faulkner, National Risk Signatures and Human
Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Mainland China, 12 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 491, 496-97
(2010) (describing that “[w]hen in 2001 President Bush announced a moratorium on the
federal funding of stem cell research, China, as some other countries in Asia (India,
Singapore, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan), denied any engagement with the ethics that had
informed the decision. In fact, they were ready to jump into the bioethical vacuum it had
created. This vacuum was alleged to be a result of Western moral scruples about using
fertilised human cells, allegedly absent in the East.”).
182. Wei Dong, Study on Patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Related
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law of P.R.C. is the same as Article 53 of the European Directive. 183
Additionally, in the later revision to the patent law, Article 5 was not
substantially modified. Is it proper to include a moral exclusion in the
patent law though? This article takes the view that patent law should not
be used as a tool to prohibit unethical research because the law’s primary
goals are to protect inventions and encourage creation. The principles and
clauses contained in the patent law should represent the spirit of that law.
With respect to moral exclusions, HESC research could still be continued
or sponsored in the absence of patent protection for the resulting
products.184 For example, in China, unverified stem cell therapy could be
carried out in the clinics and hospitals.185
Although China’s moral standards seem to be lower than those of
Western countries in practical application, according to the patentexamination guidelines, it is forbidden to patent the use of embryos for
commercial or industrial purposes. 186 As in Europe, the Chinese patent
regulations contain no direct definition of “embryo” or “commercial or
industrial purpose.” Thus, the Chinese patent office has encountered the
same problems as the European office. However, unlike Europe, Chinese
regulators have not needed to consider the issue of conflicting moral
standards among member states.
Since China’s moral standards on this issue are much lower than those in
Europe, 187 it is likely that Chinese regulators have adopted the moral
exclusion in patent law primarily due to the belief that it represents an
international custom. In response to pressures from stem cell markets,
some scientists from countries with restrictive policies will rush areas that

Inventions, East China University of Political Science and Law, master thesis (2011).
183. European Directive 98/44/EC on Biotechnology.
184. See Laurie, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 64 (stating how one
ay argue that the absence of patent protection may discourage research but not researching
would be an inefficient manner to tackle moral concerns and thus research will continue).
185. See Lianming Liao & Robert Chunhua Zhao, An Overview of Stem Cell-Based
Clinical Trials in China, 17 STEM CELLS & DEV. 613, 615 (2008) (reporting that “the Fourth
Military Medical University of China further used peripheral blood monocytes that had been
induced to differentiate into functional hepatocytes in vitro to treat patients with hepatitis B
virus (HBV)-related decompensated liver cirrhosis”); see also Haidan Chen, Stem Cell
Governance in China: From Bench to Bedside?, 28 NEW GENETICS & SOCIETY 267, 2274
(2009) (reporting that “Beike Biotech was set up in Shenzhen, the first special economic
zone of China on 18 July 2005. It collaborates with hospitals and treats patients in the
hospitals and then shares the resulting profit. Until 2008 Beike cooperated with thirteen
hospitals; six centers were added in 2008, and five new centers will be initiated in 2009”).
186. GUIDELINES FOR PATENT EXAMINATION, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE,
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
187. See Liu Lidong, supra note 162.
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have permissive policies or alternatively, some might engage in the
activities conducted in more permissive areas. Likewise, Chinese scientists
and doctors will blur what can and cannot be done due to a lack of medical
risks or moral concerns. HESC research involving therapeutic cloning and
other sensitive procedures cannot be effectively monitored, resulting in
“biomedical adventurism” 188 that could create a nightmare for the entire
legal and social infrastructure.
Therefore, it would be more appropriate or effective to issue a specific
regulation related to moral standards for HESC research. Any invention
permitted by that specific law should be patentable. Immoral research
should be forbidden from the beginning instead of at the patent-application
stage.189 Moreover, from an economic point of view, restricting immoral
research from the beginning could save a tremendous amount of time and
money. It would be more effective to implement specific legal regulations
applicable to HESC research than to include a general moral exclusion in
the patent law.
III. THE UNITED STATES: INCONSISTENT POLICIES ON FEDERAL FUNDING
CONTROL OF HESC RESEARCH
In the U.S., regulation of HESC research primarily centers on federal
funding control, not moral control. The story of HESC regulations in the
U.S. involves a battle between the executive and judicial branches, along
with a battle between federal and state government. 190 For decades, the
primary moral concern addressed by HESC regulation involved whether an
embryo is a legal person.191 Unlike in the EU and China, U.S. patent law
does not contain a moral exclusion. According to Juicy Whip, Inc. v.
Orange Bang, the United States Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit
held that the Patent Office should not play a role in determining whether an
invention is moral.192 In 1980, however, the United States Supreme Court
188. Doring, supra note 17, at 42 (commenting that the positivistic principle “if an
action is not illegal, by definition, it is legal” does not apply in China. Taking advantage of
the fact that policymaking lags behind scientific and economic development, in terms of the
entire legal and social infrastructure, amounts to biomedical adventurism).
189. Zhu Huan, Patentability of Embryonic Stem Cells Related Inventions, East China
University of Political Science and Law, Master’s Thesis (2008).
190. See Owen C. B. Hughes, Alan L Jakimo and Michael J. Malinowski, United States
Regulation of Stem Cell Research: Recasting Government’s Role and Questions to be
Solved, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 383 (2008) (overview of the development of U.S. law on
stem cell research).
191. G. Bahadur and M. Morrison, Patenting Human Pluripotent Cells: Balancing
Commercial, Academic and Ethical Interests 25 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 14-21 (2010).
192. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that a
beverage dispenser that simulated a fake display of churning juice, when the juice was not in
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opened the door to grant patents on “non-naturally occurring living
substances” in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.193 Since then, thousands of genes,
animals, and other organic materials have been the subjects of patent
protection.
A. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF): the opening of
“human embryo farms”
The focal points of world debate on the issue of HESC are three
fundamental patents held by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
(“WARF”). In 1998, after James Thomson published work on the isolation
of embryonic stem cell lines, WARF (as his representative) applied to the
USPTO to patent that work. Three basic patents, known as the 780, 806
and 913 patents, were issued. 194 The claims of these patents are quite
broad.195 Patents 780 and 806 claim product embryonic cells. Patent 913
claims both product embryonic stem cells and the method of obtaining
them.
WARF holds a fee-based and royalty-bearing license to make, use, and
sell HESC lines. WARF has been widely criticized for its restrictive policy
towards educational and scientific institutions.196 In the commercial area,
WARF transferred an exclusive license to Geron to develop products
derived from the patents. Because the patents cover broad HESC
technology, any commercial potential is restricted to exploitation by
fact fresh lacked utility and was therefore unpatentable).
193. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (upholding application asserting
thirty-six claims related to Chakrabarty’s invention of a bacterium from the genus
Pseudomonas containing therein at least two stable energy-generating plasmids). The patent
examiner allowed the claims falling into the first two categories, but rejected claims for the
bacteria. Id. His decision rested on two grounds: (1) that micro-organisms are products of
nature and (2) that as living things they are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101. Id.
194. United States Patent No. 5,843,780, December 1, 1998 (covering a purified
preparation of primate embryonic stem cells); United States Patent, 6,200,806, March 13,
2001 (containing a purified preparation of pluripotent human embryonic stem cell); United
States Patent, 7,029,913, April 18, 2006 (including a replicating in vitro cell culture of
human embryonic stem cells comprising cells).
195. See K. Bergman and G.D. Graff, The Global Stem Cell Patent Landscape:
Implications for Efficient Technology Transfer and Commercial Development, 5 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 419, 419 (2007) (finding these patents are to be some of “the strongest
intellectual property holdings in the whole stem cell field, establishing control at the very
root of all possible lineages of cellular differentiation[.]”).
196. See Aurora Plomer, Kenneth S Taymor and Christopher Thomas Scott, Challenges
to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patents, 2 CELL STEM CELL 13, 13 (2008) (criticizing
WARF for slowing distribution of cell lines and cast a shadow over the ability of
researchers to advance knowledge).
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Geron.197
Although the three patents application were refused for reasons of moral
concern by the EU, in the US, they were challenged for technical reasons.
The Foundation for the Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, in conjunction
with the New York-based Public Patent Foundation, challenged the patents
on grounds of obviousness with respect to the prior art. 198 In addition,
biomedical researchers worried that the USPTO’s lax practices could stifle
scientific innovation by granting patent holders overly broad rights over
basic knowledge and research tools.199 In response to concerns related to
impeding scientific and economic progress due to the lack of guidelines for
its patenting criteria, the USPTO received both oppositions.
Subsequently, WARF’s patent application was appealed amidst intense
criticism. One objection related to the cost and restrictiveness imposed on
researchers by WARF’s licensing practices.200 However, it is possible that,
the reason for the high cost of HESC research is the patent licensing fees.
For example, the Thomson patents allow WARF to demand money from
anyone who wants to use its stem cells, thus increasing the cost of research
and restricting that research to those who can afford to pay.201 Critics have
called WARF’s approach to licensing “overly costly, cumbersome and
restrictive.”202 Although opponents of HESC research have attempted to
use the patent system to stop what they consider unethical research, there is
little basis in the U.S. patent law for moral barriers against the WARF
patents.203 It appears that one of the reasons that no explicit morality clause
197. Rovert Lanza from Advanced Cell Technology in Worcester, Massachusetts,
claimed that “we would be sued if we even tried to develop insulin-producing cells to treat
diabetes.” Constance Holden, US Patent Office Casts Doubt on Wisconsin Stem Cell
Patents, 316 SCIENCE MAGAZINE. 182, 182 (2007).
198. Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of US Patent No. 5,843,780, Request for Ex
Parte Reexamination of US Patent No 6,200,806, and Request for Inter Parties
Reexamination of US Patent No 7,029,913.
199. David B Resnik, Embryonic Stem Cell Patents and Human Dignity, 15 HEALTH
CARE ANAL 211-222 (2007).
200. See John M. Golden, WARF’s Stem Cell Patents and Tensions Between Public and
Private Sector Approaches to Research, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 314, 315 (2010).
201. See Terry Devitt, Wisconsin Scientists Culture Elusive Embryonic Stem Cells,
(Nov. 6, 1998) available at http://www.news.wisc.edu/3327 (stating that finding ways to
direct the human embryonic stem cells to become specific cells of clinical importance is an
important next step required before new therapies can be developed).
202. See Golden, supra note 200, at 315 (stating the WARF’s patents cover many HESC
lines in the U.S. and have been used to assert control over many beyond the scope of the
patent).
203. Id. (analyzing that U.S. patent law provides comparatively little basis for such a
morality-oriented barrier to WARF’s patents. Instead, challenges to WARF’s patents in the
United States have attacked the value of Thomson’s scientific contribution).
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exists in U.S. patent law is the lack of an intense debate and discussion in
the U.S. over whether HESC should be considered patent-eligible subject
matter.
B. Political interventions—the federal funding control of HESC research
under moral concerns
It is necessary to have an overview of the core of U.S. political system—
the social contract—before looking into the specific issue of HESC. 204
With respect to HESC research, the question of whether stem cells are
persons is not hotly debated in the U.S. Instead, the focus of the argument
is whether federal funding should be granted for HESC research. Indeed,
there are no federal regulations in the United States that restrict HESC
research. On the contrary, control over HESC research relates to the
allocation of federal funding.205 There are three levels of federal funding of
HESC research: (1) complete prohibition, (2) limited prohibition, and (3)
permission. For a long time, the government banned federal funding of any
research that involved human embryos.206
However, in 1996, pursuant to Executive Order 12,975, the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission (“NBAC”) was established to protect “the
rights and welfare of human research subjects and issues in the
management and use of genetic information.”207
NBAC’s establishment was a profound historical event in the regulation
of HESC research because it “increased the awareness of U.S. and foreign
governments, international groups, the research community, and the public
about complex bioethical issues, thereby helping to provide a forum for
public debate.” 208 In the meantime, President Clinton required relevant
204. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, 1-138 (1st ed., 2010) (stating
that the social contract can be described as follows: “Each of us puts his person and all of
his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we
receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole”).
205. Christine Vestal, Stem Cell Research at the Crossroads of Religion and Politics,
PEW FORUM PAPER (July 17, 2008), available at http://pewforum.org/Science-andBioethics/Stem-Cell-Research-at-the-Crossroads-of-Religion-and-Politics.aspx.
206. See PAUL MURRAY MCNEILL, THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION 119 (1st ed., 1993) (providing an overview of “balancing interests of
researchers against the protection of the interests of subjects of human experimentation”);
see also Kyla Dunn, The Politics of Stem Cells, NOVA SCIENCENOW (Jan. 4 2005)
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/stem-cells-politics.html (discussing the
illegality of using federal funds for “any experiment that creates or destroys a human
embryo”).
207. Exec. Order No. 12,975, 3 C.F.R. 1759 (1995).
208. EISEMAN ELISA, THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION: CONTRIBUTING
TO PUBLIC POLICY 130 (1st ed., 2003).

JIANG_ FINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS

1/29/2015 1:25 PM

87

executive agencies, within the NBAC, to report their opinions on
developing human-subject-protection policies. 209 Based on an NBAC
report, President Clinton signed the “Cloning Prohibition Act of 1997” to
ban the creation of babies through somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning.210
Although the history of federal involvement in HESC research is quite
complex, these events are distinguishable from the jurisdictional battle over
federal regulation of HESC research.
1. The National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act: Allow Federal
Funding of Research Related to Embryos at the Early Stage
The Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) is the chief
U.S. government agency providing human services, granting federal
research funds, and providing health insurance. HHS consists of eleven
operating divisions. Among these divisions, the National Institutes of
Health (“NIH”) is responsible for funding biomedical and health-related
research. Initially, research related to human subjects was prohibited from
receiving federal funds. In September 1988, the NIH Advisory Committee
voted to lift the moratorium on the use of federal funds for fetal-tissue
transplantation research.211 In 1993, President Clinton, supported by the
NIH review panel, lifted the moratorium, and a congressional hearing
followed.212
Next, the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act authorized
federal funding of research involving human fetal tissue transplantation.213
This Act also paved the way for federal funding of research related to
early-stage embryos.214 With the endorsement of the National Institutes of
209. Mary Leinhos, The US National Bioethics Advisory Commission as a Boundary
Organism, 32 SCI. & PUB. POL. 423, 426 (2005) (“The Commission was granted the
authority to deliberate on additional issues raised by the general public, other federal bodies
and organizations, or NBAC itself.”).
210. Id. at 427 (stating that “[c]onsistent with the NBAC’s recommendation, the
President’s legislative proposal contained a five-year prohibition on the use of somatic cell
nuclear transfer to create human beings and directed the NBAC to report to the President
after four and one-half years about whether to continue the ban.”).
211. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, HUMAN FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH
(1988).
212. Helen M. Maroney, Bioethical Catch-22: The Moratorium on Federal Funding of
Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research and the NIH Revitalization Amendments, 9 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y. 485, 487 (1993).
213. Research on Human Fetal Tissue Amendments Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 289g-1
note (2012).
214. Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (1994) (commenting on the Act as
follows: “This law [the Revitalization Act] amended existing federal regulations governing
research on human embryos, which required such research to be reviewed by an EAB before
such research might proceed. Because prior presidential administrations apparently chose
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Health Revitalization Act, in 1994, the NIH set up the Human Embryo
Research Panel to develop policies for the use of embryos and the moral
scope of that research.
2. Dickey-Wicker Amendment: No Federal Funding on HESC Research
Involving Destruction of an Embryo
Contrary to his previous position, President Clinton issued an executive
order to ban federal funding of HESC research in the wake of a resounding
Democratic electoral defeat.215 In 1995, consistent with President Clinton’s
declaration, Congress overrode the decision to sponsor some types of stemcell research. The Dickey-Wicker Amendment, named for Representatives
Jay Dickey and Roger Wicker, was approved by Congress.216 The DickeyWicker Amendment is a rider to other legislation concerning HHS. It is the
first regulation to focus specifically on embryo research and is also the
United States’ most important regulation regarding HESC research.
Subpart A of the Amendment reflects an endorsement of the existing
prohibition on embryo creation. Parallel to Subpart A, Subpart B adds a
ban on federal funding of any research involving embryos obtained from in
vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures. 217 It is clear that research involved
with the destruction of embryos is excluded from federal funding.
However, the problem of research using already-destroyed embryos from
IVF is still unsettled, which has led to debate.
Despite the lack of federal funding, HESC research has developed and
flourished with private support. In 1998, scientists claimed that they had
successfully derived stem cells from human embryos and emphasized the
potential of stem cells to grow into specific cells. 218 Following this
not to appoint an EAB, no funding for such research had in fact been approved. What the
new law did was to reverse the conditions for in vitro fertilization research: it could go
forward unless disapproved. Previously it could not go forward unless approved”).
215. Heather J Meeker, Issues of Property, Ethics and Consent in the Transplantation of
Fetal Reproductive Tissue, 9 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 185, 187 (1994) (citing profound ethical
and moral questions associated with the subject, refused to follow the contrary
recommendation of a National Institutes of Health panel).
216. Dickey Amendment, Pub. L. 111-8, § 509, 123 Stat. 803 (1996).
217. Id. (The Amendment’s prohibitions read as follows: (a) None of the funds made
available in this Act may be used for—(1) The creation of a human embryo or embryos for
research purposes; (2) Research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed,
discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for
research on fetuses in uteri. (b) For purposes of this section, the term ‘human embryo or
embryos’ includes any organism, not protected as a human subject under 45 CFR 46 as of
the date of the enactment of this Act, that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis,
cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes or human diploid cells).
218. James A Thomson, Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts,
282 SCI. 1145, 1145-46 (1998).
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landmark development, on January 15, 1999, top HHS lawyer Harriet Rabb
declared that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment should not apply to derived
stem cells because such cells “are not a human embryo within the statutory
definition.” 219 Therefore, HHS took the position that the NIH could
provide federal funding to HESC research on the ground that a stem cell
could not become an organism because it had not been implanted into a
uterus.220
In response to the HHS opinion, the NIH appointed a group of experts to
develop appropriate guidelines. Meanwhile, the notion that federal funds
could be used for HESC research was backed by the Clinton
administration.221 However, seventy-seven Congressional opponents wrote
two letters to the Secretary of HHS to criticize the provision allowing
federal funding to HESC research.222
3. NIH Guideline 2000
Regardless of the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act and the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment’s contradictory interpretations, the NIH
published a Guideline outlining funding-ineligible types of HESC
research.223 The Guideline restricts the scope of federal funds to stem cells
219. See Letter from Harriet Rabb, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to
Harold Varmus, Director, NIH, (Jan. 15, 1999) (General Counsel Rabb determined that the
statutory ban on human embryonic research defined an embryo as an “organism” that, when
implanted in the uterus, is capable of becoming a human being); see also JUDITH A JOHNSON
& ERIN D WILLIAMS, CRS REPORT: STEM CELL RESEARCH: FEDERAL RESEARCH FUNDING
AND
OVERSIGHT,
7
(Apr.
18,
2007)
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33540.pdf.
220. Meredith Wadman, Embryonic Stem Cell Research Exempt from Ban, NIH is Told,
397 NATURE 185-86 (1999) (quoting an NIH official, “this opinion allows us to proceed
carefully and thoughtfully with a line of research that has enormous potential for the
treatment of almost every disease and condition”).
221. See Eliot Marshall, Ethicists Back Stem Cell Research, White House Treads
Cautiously, 285 SCI. 502, 503 (1999).
222. Meredith Wadman, Congress May Block Stem Cell Research, 397 NATURE 639,
639 (1999) (The writer claimed that Rabb “makes a specious distinction by reading the law
narrowly” to apply only to the act of destroying embryos, and not more broadly to include
any research that depends on their destruction; Jay Dickey, the author of the existing ban,
also stated that stem-cell derivation was “precisely the kind of research for which we
intended to ban, and did ban, federal funding”).
223. Clinton administration NIH Guidelines for embryonic stem cell funding, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,975, Aug. 25, 2000. The Guidelines state that the following research areas are
ineligible for NIH funding:
A. The derivation of pluripotent stem cells from human embryos; B. Research in
which human pluripotent stem cells are utilized to create or contribute to a human
embryo; C. Research utilizing pluripotent stem cells derived from human embryos
created for research purposes, rather than for fertility treatment; D. Research in
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derived from ‘human embryos created for the purposes of fertility
treatment and exceeded the clinical need of the individuals seeking such
treatment’.224 The Guideline also established a national review panel, the
NIH Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Review Group.225
However, before the NIH could provide funding, the Bush
Administration took power and conducted a legal review of Clinton-era
policy. Implementation of the Guideline was halted and federal funding
was never granted. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration had already
opened the door for federal funding of HESC research.226
4. The Bush Compromise accepted the narrow explanation of DickeyWicker Amendment but exercised the executive power instead of legal
power to allocate funding
Immediately after President Bush took office in January 2001, he
ordered “another look at the options regarding HESC research policy,”
including a review of Rabb’s decision.227 Next, President Bush articulated
his own policy by suspending the NIH’s implementation of funding and
repealing the NIH Guideline. 228 Some scientists and patients expressed
anger and frustration with this decision.229
which human pluripotent stem cells were derived using somatic cell nuclear
transfer, i.e., the transfer of a human somatic cell nucleus into a human or animal
egg; E. Research utilizing human pluripotent stem cells derived using somatic cell
nuclear transfer, i.e., the transfer of a human somatic cell nucleus into a human or
animal egg; F. Research in which human pluripotent stem cells are combined with
an animal embryo; and G. Research in which human pluripotent stem cells are used
in combination with somatic cell nuclear transfer for the purposes of the
reproductive cloning of a human.
224. Id.
225. Nicholas Wade, New Rules on Use of Human Embryos in Cell Research, N.Y.
TIMES, (Aug. 24, 2000) http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/24/us/new-rules-on-use-ofhuman-embryos-in-cell-research.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
(President Clinton commented that the Guideline was a proper because “we cannot walk
away from the potential to save lives and improve lives, to help people literally to get up and
walk, to do all kinds of things we could never have imagined”).
226. Kyla Dunn, The Politics of Stem Cells, NOVA SCIENCE NOW, (Sept. 13, 2014, 3:37
PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/stem-cells-politics.html.
227. The President’s Council on Bioethics, The Administration’s Human Embryonic
Stem Cell Research Funding Policy: Moral and Political Foundations, THE PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL
ON
BIOETHICS
(Sept.
13,
2014,
4:11
PM),
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/index.html.
228. Id.
229. Rick Weiss, Bush Administration Order Halts Stem Cell Meeting; NIH Planned
Session to Review Fund Requests, WASH. POST, at A02 (Apr. 21, 2001) (reporting that one
member of NIH criticized that “the decision certainly is holding up research that could
potentially affect many of people with a number of different diseases . . . . Nobel laureate
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On August 9, 2001, President Bush launched his newly crafted policy for
HESC research in a national television speech. He announced that to avoid
sanctioning or encouraging further destruction of human embryos, federal
grants would only be available for research using the sixty four stem cell
lines that were already in existence.230
President Bush’s view on the ethics of HESC research were quite
different from that of President Clinton.231 Stem cell separation results in
the deprivation of the embryo’s human potential because it destroys the
embryo. Thus, President Bush decided to “allow federal funds to be used
for research on these existing stem cell lines, where the life-and-death
decision has already been made.”232
After the new policy was implemented, its moral, legal, and political
implications were hotly debated among media, politicians, scientists, and
organizations. The Bush policy was known as “The Bush Compromise.”
One reason for that characterization is that the policy apparently straddles
the line between the conservative and liberal views on the question of
governing federal funding. Another possible reason is that the policy tried
to satisfy both the scientific communities and pro-life communities.233 To
some extent, The Bush Compromise accepted the narrow view exemplified
by the Dickey-Wicker Amendment. However, The Bush Compromise also
adopted a new, broad concept of embryonic human life. In addition, The
Bush Compromise changed the executive and legislative branches’
positions on the question of federal funding for HESC research. It not only
acknowledged Congress’s sole authority to legislate but also exercised
Paul Berg feared that U.S. researchers stand to lose their edge in the biomedical revolution
because Britain, France and Canada have been passing more liberal rules for research on
embryo cells”).
230. Press Release, White House, White House Fact Sheet on Embryonic Stem Cell
Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=79025..
(The new policy provided as follows: “Federal funds will only be used for research on
existing stem cell lines that were derived: (1) with the informed consent of the donors; (2)
from excess embryos created solely for reproductive purposes; and (3) without any financial
inducements to the donors. No federal funds will be used for: (1) the derivation or use of
stem cell lines derived from newly destroyed embryos; (2) the creation of any human
embryos for research purposes; or (3) the cloning of human embryos for any purpose”).
231. Press release, George W. Bush, President George W.Bush’s Address on Stem Cell
Research
(Aug.
9,
2001),
available
at
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/08/09/bush.transcript/ (describing the embryo
as “a snowflake in that each of these embryos is unique, with the unique genetic potential of
an individual human being” and recommending that under the Bush policy, “a five-day-old
cluster of stem cells is not an embryo, not yet an individual, but a pre-embryo”).
232. Id.
233. Patrick Walsh, Stemming the Tide of Stem Cell Research: The Bush Compromise,
38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2005).
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executive power to allocate funding.234 This new policy inevitably raised
many concerns that scientists might move to other countries.235
5. The Report from the President Council on Bioethics clarified that the
enforcement law was the Dickey Amendment
Following a public announcement on August 9th, President Bush
established the Presidential Council on Bioethics. According to the Kass
statement, the Council aims to provide “an adequate moral and ethical lens
through which to view particular developments in their proper scope and
depth.”236 It was quite different from previous councils because the White
House was in charge of appointing its members. Chairman Kass
proclaimed that the Council would listen to both religious and secular
voices in its consideration of HESC research.
Following its proceedings, in January 2004, the Council published a
report on monitoring stem-cell research. The report summarizes ethical,
legal and policy issues around applications of stem cell research.237 The
report concluded that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment was enforceable law.
Federal funds should not be used to “encourage the exploitation or
destruction of nascent human life, even if scientific and medical benefits
might come from such acts.”238 The research should aim to cure deadly
diseases provided it respects important moral boundaries. Meanwhile, the
award of federal funding is a significant issue to be handled with care.239
234. O. Carter Snead, The Pedagogical Significance of the Bush Stem Cell Policy: A
Window into Bioethical Regulation in the United States, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y. L. &
ETHICS 491, 498 (2005) (demonstrating “both an acknowledgement of Congress’s sole
authority to appropriate federal funds and a robust exercise of the President’s authority as
head of the executive branch to allocate the appropriated funding according to the
[a]dministration’s priorities”).
235. See Tom Abate, UCSF Stem Cell Expert Leaving U.S./Scientist Fears That
Political Uncertainty Threatens His Research, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 17, 2001,
http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/UCSF-stem-cell-expert-leaving-U-S-Scientist2899802.php (documenting one biology professor’s move from San Francisco to Britain in
order to continue his research on human embryonic stem cells).
236. See Monitoring Stem Cell Research: Reports by the President’s Council on
Bioethics (Jan. 2004), available at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/.
237. See Letter from Leon R. Kass M.D., Chairman of the President’s Council on
Bioethics,
to
President
Bush
(March
31,
2004),
available
at
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/transmittal.html
(summarizing the main points addressed in the report).
238. Patrick Walsh, Stemming the Tide of Stem Cell Research: The Bush Compromise,
38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2005).
239. Id. at 1078 (proposing a four-part test to determine status of embryotic tissue for
research and suggesting the President Bush institute a federal agency to oversee subsequent
research).
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The council also announced reports on alternative sources of stem cells,
human cloning, human dignity, and bioethics. However, these reports did
not have a substantial effect on public debate in the U.S.240 The Council’s
approach was criticized as “entertaining with the spectacle of enhanced
bodies and immortal lives but offering little meaningful and substantive
ethical analysis.”241
6. Executive order by President Obama: Reversing The Bush Compromise
Its practical import aside, The Bush Compromise had pedagogical
significance for legal developments in regulating HESC research. The
General Council of the President’s Council on Bioethics evaluated The
Bush Compromise as “provid[ing] an unparalleled window into the nature
and substance of ‘bioethical regulation’ within the unique framework of the
American system of government.” 242 However, President Obama has
expressed dissatisfaction with the policy restricting federal funding of
HESC research.243
On March 9, 2009, President Obama signed an executive order to lift the
ban on HESC funding. Research related to embryonic stem cell lines
created after August 2001 could receive federal funding. Privately funded
research was not affected. However, the creation of stem cell lines
involving the destruction of embryos was still prohibited from receiving
federal funds.244
The order did not clearly describe standards for which stem cell lines
would be eligible for federal funds. The rule unlocking federal funding
was challenged by the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, which prohibited
240. Leigh Turner, Science, Politics and the President’s Council on Bioethics, 22
NATURE BIOTECH. 509, 509 (2004) (commenting that while the reports did not have “a
dramatic effect on public debates,” the recent membership shake up in the US President’s
Council put the Council “back in the limelight”).
241. Leigh Turner, Has the President’s Council on Bioethics Missed the Boat?, 327 THE
BMJ 629, 629 (2003).
242. See Snead, supra note 235 at 234, at 492.
243. Obama Overturns Bush Policy on Stem Cells, CNN (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-03-09/politics/obama.stem.cells_1_cancer-and-spinal-cordembryonic-cell-research?_s=PM:POLITICS (quoting President Obama where he
commented that “[i]n recent years, when it comes to stem cell research, rather than
furthering discovery, our government has forced what I believe is a false choice between
sound science and moral values”); see also Exec. Order No. 13,505, 3 C.F.R. 229 (2010).
244. See Exec. Order No. 13,505, 3 C.F.R. 229 (2010) (stating that Section 1 of the
executive order provides as follows: “Research involving human embryonic stem cells and
human non-embryonic stem cells has the potential to lead to better understanding and
treatment of many disabling diseases and conditions. Advances over the past decade in this
promising scientific field have been encouraging, leading to broad agreement in the
scientific community that the research should be supported by Federal funds”).
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funding of HESC research involving the destruction of embryos. The NIH
attempted to finish answering a host of morally and politically complicated
questions within 120 days. 245 Because the order was challenged by the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment, the President let Congress decide whether to
overturn the statutory ban on federal funding on research related to
embryo.246 Despite some weaknesses in the order, it is still a remarkable
milestone in HESC research and as President Obama commented:
Today, with the Executive Order I am about to sign, we will bring
the change that so many scientists and researchers; doctors and
innovators; patients and loved ones have hoped for, and fought
for, these past eight years: we will lift the ban on federal funding
for promising embryonic stem cell research. We will vigorously
support scientists who pursue this research. And we will aim for
America to lead the world in the discoveries that it one day may
yield.247
7. The result of the battle over the Dickey-Wicker Amendment: The Obama
Administration funding policy of HESC research could move forward
NIH planned to implement new guidelines to suggest how federal funds
should be used for HESC research.248 This was welcome news to scientists
who had applauded President Obama’s new policy. 249 However, in a
shocking case issued on August 23, 2010, a Federal District Court judge
ruled against the Obama executive order. 250 In Sherley v. Sebelius, the
District Court held that federal funding for HESC research clearly violated
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, which prohibits research where a “human
embryo is destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subject to risk of injury or

245. See Rob Stein, Obama’s Order on Stem Cells Leaves Key Questions to NIH, THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Mar.
10,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/09/AR2009030903156.html.
246. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama is Leaving Some Stem Cell Issues to Congress,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/us/politics/09stem.html.
247. See Jesse Lee, “A Debt of Gratitude to So Many Tireless Advocates,” WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 9, 2009, 12:09 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/09/A-debtof-gratitude-to-so-many-tireless-advocates/.
248. See generally Devin Dwyer, NIH Issues New Stem Cell Research Guidelines as
Obama Administration Prepares to Appeal Court Ruling, POLITICAL PUNCH BLOG (Aug. 31,
2010)
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/08/nih-issues-new-stem-cell-researchguidelines-as-obama-administration-prepares-to-appeal-court-ruling/.
249. Id.
250. See Sherley v. Sebelius, 704 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71-72 (D.D.C. 2010) (overruling the
National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Human Cell Research, which were promulgated
in response to President Obama’s Executive Order, because embryonic stem cell research
involves the destruction of an embryo in violation of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment).
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death greater than that allowed under applicable regulations.”251
On the same day of the ruling, the Obama administration decided to
appeal because of the judgment’s potential to block federal funding of
HESC research. 252 On September 9, 2010, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned the District Court’s ruling
and provided temporary permission for federal funding of HESC research.
253
The harm caused by the District Court’s ruling “poured sand into that
engine of discovery.”254 A few months later, at the request of the federal
government, a federal appellate court reinstated the presidential policy and
suspended the injunction issued by the district court.255
The court dispute over the Dickey-Wicker Amendment flared up again
on April 29, 2011 when the appellate court permanently overturned the
district court’s injunction, holding that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment was
ambiguous.256 The NIH applauded the ruling, with a spokesperson stating,
“I am delighted and relieved to learn of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.”257 The ruling was reconfirmed on July 27, 2011, when a federal
judge dismissed the legal challenge to government funding of HESC
research. 258 Ultimately, President Obama’s policy allowing funding for
251. Id. (finding that the new NIH Guidelines allowed federal funding of HESC
research, which involves the destruction of embryos).
252. See generally Dwyer, supra note 248, 248 (criticizing that the ruling as one that
could “cause irreparable damage and delay potential breakthroughs to improve care for
people living with serious diseases and conditions . . . the injunction threatens to stop
progress in one of the most encouraging areas of biomedical research”).
253. See Janice Hopkins Tanne, US Court Temporarily Lifts Ban Imposed in August on
Stem
Cell
Research,
THE
BMJ
(Sept.
10,
2010),
http://www.bmj.com/content/341/bmj.c4981.
254. Id. (stating that “[t]he ruling threw the field into disarray, immediately halting
some projects and causing the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) to put a hold on many
research grants”).
255. See Ubaka Ogbogu, US Appeal Court Reinstates Obama’s Funding Policy on Stem
Cell
Research,
STEM
CELL
NETWORK,
(May
2,
2011),
http://scnblog.typepad.com/scnblog/2011/05/us-appeal-court-obama-funding-policy-stemcell-research.html.
256. See Bill Mears, Appeals Court Lifts Ban on Federal Funding For Stem-Cell
Research, CNN, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-04-29/us/stem.cells_1_stem-cell-research-celltypes-ban-research?_s=PM:US (last visited July 14, 2014, 10:47 AM),.
257. Maggie Fox, Appeals Court Hands Obama a Stem-Cell Victory, NATIONAL
JOURNAL (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.nationaljournal.com/healthcare/appeals-court-handsobama-a-stem-cell-victory-20110429.
258. George Annas, Embryo research was born political, STEM CELLS: BIOLOGY,
BIOETHICS,
AND
APPLICATIONS
(Oct.
28,
2010),
http://stemcellbioethics.wikischolars.columbia.edu/Legal+and+Political+History+of+Stem+
Cell+Science (reporting that the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia lifted an
injunction imposed last year by a U.S. District judge, who said all embryonic stem cell
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HESC research was allowed to proceed.
From the above, it is evident that law and morality often overlap,
especially when the government is involved. Law shapes and provides a
mechanism to balance various government interests including, curing
diseases, scientific advances, and human dignity. The regulation of HESC
research is not a simple permission or prohibition. In previous years, the
complexity of this issue has been demonstrated by the federal
government’s strategies. Nevertheless, HESC research is worthy of
attention from the White House and Congress. It appears as if the U.S.
government takes the approach of patenting first and asking questions later.
This hands-off approach is market oriented.259 Opponents have strongly
criticized this approach for its lack of ethical and social considerations.260
Scientific research can be conducted with little public oversight. In
addition, when federal funding is limited, private funding is still allowed,
which might lead to even less moral considerations related to HESC
research. Therefore, this article argues, it would be reasonable to remove
moral review of HESC from the patent law. Regulating federal funding to
HESC research is not only morally acceptable but also provides an
important tool for monitoring HESC research. Federal funding should be
allowed in HESC research; rather than patent law restrictions.
CONCLUSION
As has been demonstrated, few can deny the intrinsic link between
HESC and morality. 261 This article argues that we should effectively
control and monitor this questionable technology. The problem is whether
such control should be within the patent law system. The approach adopted
by the EU and China involves inserting moral provisions into their patent
law to limit the patentability of inventions related to HESC, whereas the
U.S. has not. The U.S. government’s approach uses federal-funding
control instead of patent control. Reviewing these various approaches,

research at the National Institutes of Health amounted to destruction of embryos, in
violation of congressional spending laws).
259. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM
CELL RESEARCH: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY
COMMISSION 59 (1999), available at https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/23
(discussing the causal link between federal support for basic biotechnology research and
firms developing marketable products).
260. Michael J. Malinowsk and Nick Littlefield, Transformation of a Research Platform
Into Commercial Products: The Impact of United States Federal Policy on Biotechnology,
in TIMOTHY A. CAULFIELD AND BRYN WILLIAMS-JONES, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
GENETIC RESEARCH: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, at 29-53 (1999).
261. See Warren-Jones, supra note 52, at 638-61.
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morality should play the role of initially filtering what research is
appropriate instead of regulating through the patent system. 262 Because
even if the results of HESC research can be patented, HESC research could
still be performed and funded. Therefore, immoral research should be
prohibited at the beginning instead of at the patent-application stage. In
addition, although the EU and China consider morality in granting patents,
there is no direct moral standard, moral definition or defined meaning of
industrial or commercial use, which inevitably results in legal
inconsistency. It seems better to establish the specific authority to monitor
HESC-related research pursuant to specific regulations before such
research is conducted. Moreover, morality clauses in patent law aim to
reduce the adverse impact of broad patents that might develop
insupportable drugs and therapies. In terms of funds invested into such
research, the reward represented by patent seems overvalued. Therefore,
this article concludes, a patent system without a morality clause would be a
critical step forward for HESC research. Infusing moral exclusions into
patent law is both inefficient and ineffective.

262. Id. (concluding that “it is time that the core morality provision is no longer viewed
as a fundamental regulator of new technology—it is an initial filter and it should never
become more than that”).

